

-----BEGIN PGP SIGNED MESSAGE-----

Hash: SHA256

NetBSD Security Advisory 2015-008

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Topic: OpenSSL and TLS protocol vulnerabilities

Version: NetBSD-current: source prior to July 7th  
 NetBSD 6.1 - 6.1.5: affected  
 NetBSD 6.0 - 6.0.6: affected  
 NetBSD 5.1 - 5.1.4: affected  
 NetBSD 5.2 - 5.2.2: affected  
 pkgsrc: affected

Severity: remote DoS, confidentiality compromise

Fixed: NetBSD-current: Jul 7th, 2015  
 NetBSD-7 branch: Jul 11th, 2015  
 NetBSD-6-0 branch: Jul 12th, 2015  
 NetBSD-6-1 branch: Jul 12th, 2015  
 NetBSD-6 branch: Jul 12th, 2015  
 NetBSD-5-2 branch: Aug 14th, 2015  
 NetBSD-5-1 branch: Aug 14th, 2015  
 NetBSD-5 branch: Aug 14th, 2015  
 pkgsrc: openssl-1.0.2d corrects these issues

Teen versions released later than the fix date will contain the fix.

Please note that NetBSD releases prior to 5.1 are no longer supported. It is recommended that all users upgrade to a supported release.

Abstract

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This advisory covers the OpenSSL Security Advisory of June 11th, 2015 which lists seven different vulnerabilities that affect NetBSD releases; also, the OpenSSL Security Advisory of July 9th, 2015 with one vulnerability that affected only NetBSD-current:

- DHE man-in-the-middle protection (Logjam, CVE-2015-4000)
- Malformed ECParameters causes infinite loop (CVE-2015-1788)
- Exploitable out-of-bounds read in X509\_cmp\_time (CVE-2015-1789)
- PKCS7 crash with missing EnvelopedContent (CVE-2015-1790)
- CMS verify infinite loop with unknown hash function (CVE-2015-1792)
- Race condition handling NewSessionTicket (CVE-2015-1791)
- Invalid free in DTLS (CVE-2014-8176)

and  
Alternative chains certificate forgery (CVE-2015-1793)

Also, in NetBSD 5 a regression was introduced October 19th last year concerning the SSL server code.

Technical Details

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See <https://www.openssl.org/news/secadv/20150611.txt>  
and <https://www.openssl.org/news/secadv/20150709.txt>

The regression in NetBSD 5.\* was due to a faulty application

of the POODLE mitigation code, and made the SSL server fail the client handshake request, with the exception of SSLv3 and TLS1 handshakes where RC4\_MD5 was an acceptable cipher, which would then be the cipher getting used. In summary this caused a comparably weak cipher to be used if the connection succeeded as all.

Fixing this problem provides only limited help, though: Please be aware that while the crypto library from the OpenSSL in NetBSD 5.x is still ok, that is not true for the ssl library. The ssl library supports as newest and safest protocol TLS 1.0, and that is no longer considered good enough. At the same time we cannot just update OpenSSL on that branch to a newer version since all available newer ones are incompatible.

#### Solutions and Workarounds =====

**Solution:**  
Update the OpenSSL libraries and restart all affected services.

**Users of NetBSD 5.\*:**  
Please consider using OpenSSL from pkgsrc for all uses where you actually want secure SSL connections. Programs in that use libssl are: amd, pkgtools, postfix, hostapd, wpa\_supplicant, httpd and the ldap client. In cases where you use the encrypted communications feature of these programs across an untrusted medium, using replacements from pkgsrc is recommended as well.

- From source:  
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Update src and rebuild and install.

For NetBSD-6\*, NetBSD-7\* and NetBSD-current:  
cvs update -dP -r <branch> crypto/external/bsd/openssl

- From tarballs:  
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To obtain fixed binaries, fetch the appropriate base.tgz and comp.tgz from a daily build later than the fix dates, from <http://nyftp.netbsd.org/pub/NetBSD-daily/<rel>/<date>/<arch>/binary/sets/> with a date later than the fix date for your branch as listed above, and your release version and architecture (e.g. <http://nyftp.netbsd.org/pub/NetBSD-daily/netbsd-6-1/201503XXXX00Z/amd64/binary/sets/>), and then extract the files:

Shared libraries:

```
tar xzpf base.tgz \*libssl\* \*libcrypto\*
```

And static libraries and linker config files:

```
tar xzpf comp.tgz \*libssl\* \*libcrypto\*
```

Get the fixed library into use

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Since the vulnerability is in a shared library, getting the old library purged and the fixed one into use requires restarting all programs that load libssl. The easiest way to do this is to reboot the system.

Another method, using /bin/sh:

```
ps ax -o pid | (while read pid; do \
    pmap $pid | egrep '(libssl|libcrypto)' && echo found $pid ;\
done)
```

will find non-chrooted programs that have the affected libraries open; you'll need to restart them. sshd, ntp and named may not show up in this list since they may run chrooted and re-exec'ed but they also would need to be restarted. ldd <programname> will show the shared libraries a program will want to use.

Thanks To  
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Thanks to the OpenSSL development team for the advisory and fixes. OpenSSL also credits:  
Joseph Burr-Pixton for reporting CVE-2015-1788  
Robert Swiecki (Google) and Hanno Back for reporting CVE-2015-1789  
Michal Zalewski (Google) for reporting CVE-2015-1790  
Johannes Bauer for reporting CVE-2015-1792  
Praveen Kariyanahalli, Ivan Fratric (Google) and Felix Groebert (Google) for reporting CVE-2014-8176  
Adam Langley (Google/BoringSSL), David Benjamin (Google/BoringSSL) for reporting CVE-2015-1793

Revision History  
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2015-08-19 Initial release

More Information  
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Advisories may be updated as new information becomes available. The most recent version of this advisory (PGP signed) can be found at <http://ftp.NetBSD.org/pub/NetBSD/security/advisories/NetBSD-SA2015-008.txt.asc>

Information about NetBSD and NetBSD security can be found at <http://www.NetBSD.org/> and <http://www.NetBSD.org/Security/> .

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