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# Integer overflow in DWA decoder outBufferEnd pointer arithmetic (missed variant of CVE-2026-34589)

High cary-ilm published GHSA-m5qw-23x2-6phj 2 days ago

## Package

### OpenEXR

#### Affected versions

3.2.0–3.2.7, 3.3.0–3.3.9, 3.4.0–3.4.9

#### Patched versions

3.2.8, 3.3.10, 3.4.10

## Description

### Summary

`internal_dwa_compressor.h:1040` performs `chan->width * chan->bytes_per_element` in `int32` arithmetic without a `(size_t)` cast. This is the same overflow pattern fixed in other decoders by [CVE-2026-34589/34588/34544](#), but this line was missed.

### Details

In `DwaCompressor_uncompress()`, line 1040:

```
outBufferEnd += chan->width * chan->bytes_per_element;
```



`chan->width` is `int32_t` (from the EXR dataWindow header), `chan->bytes_per_element` is `int8_t` (4 for FLOAT). The multiplication is done in signed 32-bit. For `width > 536, 870, 912` with a FLOAT channel, the product exceeds `INT32_MAX` and wraps negative.

`outBufferEnd` is `uint8_t*` — the wrapped value causes it to advance by a wrong amount. `DctCoderChannelData_push_row` then stores row pointers that alias earlier buffer regions. When `LossyDctDecoder_execute` writes decoded pixels through these pointers, it corrupts the heap.

The same file already has the correct pattern on other lines:

- Line 1215: `(size_t) chan->width * (size_t) pixelSize` — cast present
- Line 1699: `(size_t) curc->width * (size_t) curc->height` — cast present
- Line 1040: no cast — missed

The file `internal_dwa_compressor.h` has no git changes related to integer overflow fixes. The recent patches (commits `7c31424`, `088859f`, `e464a33`, `f5beec2`, `cf9bf84`) addressed PIZ, B44, PXR24, `generic_unpack()`, and `LossyDctDecoder_execute`, but not this code path.

## Reachability

```
Crafted EXR (DWAA/DWAB compression, dataWindow width > 537M)
→ exr_start_read() parses header (default max image size = 0, no limit)
→ exr_decoding_run()
→ internal_exr_undo_dwa() → DwaCompressor_uncompress()
→ line 1040: int32 overflow in pointer arithmetic
→ aliased row pointers → heap corruption in LossyDctDecoder_execute
```



No default image size limit is enforced (`sMaxW = 0` in `base.c:128`).

## Suggested fix

```
outBufferEnd += (size_t) chan->width * (size_t) chan->bytes_per_element;
```



Same pattern already used on lines 1215 and 1699 in the same file.

## Impact

Heap buffer corruption when opening a crafted DWAA/DWAB EXR file. Same impact class as [CVE-2026-34589](#) — OOB write via integer overflow in DWA decoder.

### Severity

High 8.4 / 10

#### CVSS v4 base metrics

#### Exploitability Metrics

Attack Vector

Local

Attack Complexity

Low

Attack Requirements	None
Privileges Required	None
User interaction	Active
<b>Vulnerable System Impact Metrics</b>	
Confidentiality	High
Integrity	High
Availability	High
<b>Subsequent System Impact Metrics</b>	
Confidentiality	None
Integrity	None
Availability	None
<a href="#">Learn more about base metrics</a>	

CVSS:4.0/AV:L/AC:L/AT:N/PR:N/UI:A/VC:H/VI:H/VA:H/SC:N/SI:N/SA:N

**CVE ID**

CVE-2026-40250

**Weaknesses**

▶ CWE-190

**Credits**



Medoedus

Reporter