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# Stored XSS via Paragraph Content in MaxKB #28

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Stored XSS via Paragraph Content in MaxKB

## Identification

- **Project:** MaxKB
- **Repository:** <https://github.com/1Panel-dev/MaxKB>
- **Affected Version/Commit:** <= v2.6.1

## CVE Description

A Stored Cross-Site Scripting (XSS) vulnerability exists in MaxKB. Authenticated users with dataset management permissions can create paragraphs containing arbitrary HTML/Markdown content. The application stores this content without sanitization and subsequently renders it in the UI using the `md-editor-v3 MdPreview` component, which does not sanitize HTML by default. This allows attackers to inject malicious JavaScript that executes when other users, including administrators, view the paragraph or execution details.

## Affected Component

- **File(s):** `apps/knowledge/views/paragraph.py` , `apps/knowledge/serializers/paragraph.py` , `ui/src/views/paragraph/component/ParagraphCard.vue`
- **Function / Method:** `post()` , `get_paragraph_problem_model()` , `MdPreview` rendering
- **Entry Point:** `content` parameter in POST `/api/workspace/{workspace_id}/knowledge/{knowledge_id}/document/{document_id}/paragraph`

## Reproduction Summary

1. An authenticated attacker with dataset management permissions sends a POST request to create a paragraph, including a malicious payload in the `content` field (e.g., `<img src=x onerror=alert('XSS')>`).
2. The backend stores the unsanitized `content` payload directly in the database.
3. A victim views the paragraph execution details in the UI.
4. The `ParagraphCard` component renders the unsanitized HTML via `MdPreview`, causing the browser to execute the injected JavaScript.

## Technical Details

### Entry Point Code ( `apps/knowledge/views/paragraph.py:72-75` ):

```
def post(self, request: Request, workspace_id: str, knowledge_id: str, document_id: str):  
    return result.success(ParagraphSerializers.Create(  
        data={'workspace_id': workspace_id, 'knowledge_id': knowledge_id, 'document_id': document_id}  
    ).save(request.data))
```

### Missing Sanitization in Serializer ( `apps/knowledge/serializers/paragraph.py:323-329` ):

```
paragraph = Paragraph(  
    id=uuid.uuid7(),  
    document_id=document_id,  
    content=instance.get("content"), # ← User input, NO sanitization  
    knowledge_id=knowledge_id,  
    title=instance.get("title") if 'title' in instance else ''  
)
```

### Sink / Vulnerable Component ( `ui/src/views/paragraph/component/ParagraphCard.vue:136-143` ):

```
<MdPreview  
  ref="editorRef"  
  editorId="preview-only"  
  :modelValue="data.content"  
  class="maxkb-md"  
  style="background: none"  
  @clickPreview="handleClickCard(data)"  
>
```

### Proof of Concept - Malicious Request:

```
POST /api/workspace/{workspace_id}/knowledge/{knowledge_id}/document/{document_id}/paragraph  
Host: target.com  
Authorization: Bearer <attacker_token>
```

Content-Type: application/json

```
{
  "content": "<img src=x onerror=alert(document.cookie)>",
  "title": "XSS Payload"
}
```

## Validation Notes

Verification Notes:

- `sanitize-html` package is installed in `package.json` but **\*\*NOT used\*\*** in the codebase
- `MdPreview` component does NOT pass any sanitize option to `md-editor-v3`



shaohuzhang1 3 weeks ago



The XSS rendered by MdPreview has been fixed in version 2.5.0 [1Panel-dev/MaxKB#4578](#)  
Did you reproduce it on version 2.6.1



AnalogyC0de 3 weeks ago

Owner

Author



I started by conducting vulnerability mining on previous version 2.2.1 of the code, when writing the vulnerability report, though I did code review of the latest version, but I have missed this fix. I have checked the XSS is fixed in current version, sorry for the false positive.

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## Metadata

### Assignees

No one assigned

### Labels

No labels

**Projects**

No projects

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**Milestone**

No milestone



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**Relationships**

None yet

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**Development**

 Code with agent mode 

No branches or pull requests

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**Participants**

