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ospfd: harden TE/SR TLV iteration against malformed lengths #21002

Merged **mjstapp** merged 1 commit into `FRRouting:master` from `Jafaral:ospf-fix` on Mar 5[Conversation](#) 7 [Commits](#) 1 [Checks](#) 19 [Files changed](#) 2**Jafaral** commented on Mar 4 • editedMember

Use 32-bit counters and per-iteration TLV size bounds checks in OSPF TE/SR TLV parsers so malformed opaque LSAs cannot wrap loop accounting and advance pointers beyond the LSA buffer.

- Change loop accumulators from 16-bit to 32-bit (`uint32_t`) to prevent wraparound
- Rework TLV iteration so pointer advancement is controlled in-loop
- Add per-iteration guard before advancing:
 - `tlv_size <= (len - sum)` (Or `length - sum`)
- On malformed size, parser now logs and exits/breaks the loop safely instead of stepping past buffer limits

👍 1**frrbot** (Bot) added the `ospf` label on Mar 4**github-actions** (Bot) added `master` `size/L` labels on Mar 4**Jafaral** force-pushed the `ospf-fix` branch from `c633e41` to `3ca8edf` last month Compare**mjstapp** self-requested a review last month**greptile-apps** (Bot) commented on Mar 4

Greptile Summary


This PR hardens the OSPF TE/SR TLV parsers in `ospfd/ospf_sr.c` and `ospfd/ospf_te.c` against malformed opaque LSAs by (1) widening loop accumulators from `uint16_t` to `uint32_t` to prevent wraparound, and (2) adding an explicit upper-bound check (`tlv_size > remaining`) before advancing each TLV pointer. The changes are correct and the loop-termination logic is sound.

- **uint32_t promotion** — `length / sum / len` variables changed from `uint16_t` to `uint32_t` in all seven affected loops, eliminating the wraparound path where an adversary could craft a sequence of TLVs whose cumulative size wraps a 16-bit counter and causes the parser to re-enter already-consumed data.
- **Upper-bound guard** — Each loop now checks `tlv_size > length - sum` before processing and advancing, preventing out-of-bounds pointer advancement when a single malformed TLV field advertises a length larger than the remaining buffer.
- **Safe early exit** — On a malformed size, every loop now emits a `zlog_warn` and `break`s instead of advancing blindly, which is the correct hardening posture.
- **Dead lower-bound check** — Every loop also checks `tlv_size < TLV_HDR_SIZE`. Because `TLV_SIZE()` is defined as `TLV_HDR_SIZE + ROUNDUP(ntohs(tlvh->length), 4)` and `ROUNDUP` always returns `>= 0`, `TLV_SIZE` can never be less than `TLV_HDR_SIZE`. This half of the condition is unreachable across all 7 modified loops and creates misleading assumptions about `TLV_SIZE` invariants.

Confidence Score: 4/5

- This PR is safe to merge; it strictly strengthens existing parsing guards without changing protocol behavior on well-formed LSAs.
- The core changes (`uint32_t` widening and upper-bound TLV size checks) are mechanically straightforward and consistently applied across all seven modified loops. Loop termination is correct: the `if (sum < length)` guard before `TLV_HDR_NEXT` prevents advancing the pointer on the final iteration, and the `sum < length` outer condition ensures the loop exits properly. The identified issue is a dead `tlv_size < TLV_HDR_SIZE` check across all modified loops (unreachable since `TLV_SIZE` always `>= TLV_HDR_SIZE`), which is a clarity nit—not a functional or security concern, but worth addressing in a hardening PR for code maintainability.
- No files require special attention; both changed files follow the same consistent hardening pattern, though all occurrences of the dead lower-bound check could be simplified for clarity.

Flowchart



Last reviewed commit: [3ca8edf](#)

 **greptile-apps** Bot reviewed [on Mar 4](#)

[View reviewed changes](#)

ospfd/ospf_sr.c Outdated

```

1008 +     for (; sum < length && sub_tlvh;) {
1009 +         uint32_t tlv_size = TLV_SIZE(sub_tlvh);
1010 +
1011 +         if (tlv_size < TLV_HDR_SIZE || tlv_size > length - sum) {

```

 **greptile-apps** Bot [on Mar 4](#)

Dead lower-bound guard `tlv_size < TLV_HDR_SIZE`

`TLV_SIZE(tlvh)` expands to `(uint32_t)(TLV_HDR_SIZE + TLV_BODY_SIZE(tlvh))`, and `TLV_BODY_SIZE` is `ROUNDUP(ntohs(tlvh->length), sizeof(uint32_t))` which is always `>= 0`. Therefore `TLV_SIZE >= TLV_HDR_SIZE` (4 bytes) unconditionally — the `tlv_size < TLV_HDR_SIZE` branch can never be taken.

This same dead check appears in every modified loop across both files:

- `ospfd/ospf_sr.c:1011` — `get_ext_link_sid`
- `ospfd/ospf_sr.c:1098` — `get_ext_prefix_sid`
- `ospfd/ospf_sr.c:1429` — `ospf_sr_ri_lsa_update`
- `ospfd/ospf_te.c:2159` — `ospf_te_parse_te`
- `ospfd/ospf_te.c:2377` — `ospf_te_delete_te`
- `ospfd/ospf_te.c:2484` — `ospf_te_parse_ri`
- `ospfd/ospf_te.c:2829` — `ospf_te_parse_ext_link`

The condition is harmless today, but it implies to readers that `TLV_SIZE` can return a value smaller than the header, which is misleading. The effective guard is solely `tlv_size > length - sum`. Consider simplifying by dropping the dead half of the condition:

Suggested change

```

-         if (tlv_size < TLV_HDR_SIZE || tlv_size > length - sum)
+         if (tlv_size > length - sum) {

```

► [Prompt To Fix With AI](#)



Jafaral [on Mar 4](#)

Member

Author

Fixed!

 **mjstapp** reviewed [on Mar 4](#)

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mjstapp left a comment

Contributor

I think the greptile suggestion is valid: it would be better to be as clear as possible in this parsing code.



  [ospfd: harden TE/SR TLV iteration against malformed lengths](#) ... ✓ [d3e8aed](#)

  **Jafaral** [force-pushed](#) the `ospf-fix` branch from `3ca8edf` to `d3e8aed` [last month](#) [Compare](#)

Jafaral commented [on Mar 4](#) • edited ▾

Member Author

[@Mergifyio](#) backport stable/10.6 stable/10.5 stable/10.4 stable/10.3 stable/10.2 stable/10.1 stable/10.0



mergify Bot commented [on Mar 4](#) • edited ▾

backport stable/10.6 stable/10.5 stable/10.4 stable/10.3 stable/10.2 stable/10.1 stable/10.0

✓ **Backports have been created**

► [Details](#)

  **github-actions** Bot added the `backport` label [on Mar 4](#)

✓ **mjstapp** approved these changes [on Mar 4](#)

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mjstapp left a comment

Contributor

Thanks, looks good



mjstapp merged commit **f098dec** into **FRRouting:master** on Mar 5

23 of 42 checks passed

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This was referenced on Mar 5

ospfd: harden TE/SR TLV iteration against malformed lengths (backport #21002) #21012

Merged

ospfd: harden TE/SR TLV iteration against malformed lengths (backport #21002) #21013

Merged

ospfd: harden TE/SR TLV iteration against malformed lengths (backport #21002) #21014

Merged

ospfd: harden TE/SR TLV iteration against malformed lengths (backport #21002) #21015

Merged

ospfd: harden TE/SR TLV iteration against malformed lengths (backport #21002) #21016

Merged

ospfd: harden TE/SR TLV iteration against malformed lengths (backport #21002) #21017

Merged

ospfd: harden TE/SR TLV iteration against malformed lengths (backport #21002) #21018

Merged



donaldsharp added a commit that referenced this pull request on Mar 5



Merge pull request [#21012](#) from [FRRouting/mergify/bp/stable/10.6/pr-21002](#) [65edc70](#)



donaldsharp added a commit that referenced this pull request on Mar 5



Merge pull request [#21013](#) from [FRRouting/mergify/bp/stable/10.5/pr-21002](#) [c06b61a](#)




donaldsharp added a commit that referenced this pull request on Mar 5



Merge pull request [#21014](#) from [FRRouting/mergify/bp/stable/10.4/pr-21002](#) [67119c4](#)

 **donaldsharp** added a commit that referenced this pull request [on Mar 5](#)

 Merge pull request [#21015](#) from FRRouting/mergify/bp/stable/10.3/pr-21002 ...  [172e945](#)



 **donaldsharp** added a commit that referenced this pull request [on Mar 5](#)

 Merge pull request [#21016](#) from FRRouting/mergify/bp/stable/10.2/pr-21002 ...  [524965c](#)

 **donaldsharp** added a commit that referenced this pull request [on Mar 5](#)

 Merge pull request [#21017](#) from FRRouting/mergify/bp/stable/10.1/pr-21002 ...  [67dbdbd](#)

 **donaldsharp** added a commit that referenced this pull request [on Mar 5](#)

 Merge pull request [#21018](#) from FRRouting/mergify/bp/stable/10.0/pr-21002 ...  [221814b](#)

  **mattiaswal** mentioned this pull request [on Mar 18](#)

Bump FRR to 10.5.3 kernelkit/infix#1451

 Merged

 17 tasks

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Reviewers

 greptile-apps[bot] 

 mjstapp 

Assignees

No one assigned

Labels

[backport](#) [master](#) [ospf](#) [size/L](#)

Projects

None yet

Milestone

No milestone

Development

Successfully merging this pull request may close these issues.

None yet

2 participants

