



fix: validate server names in install commands #3522

Merged jlowin merged 2 commits into main from fix/sanitize-install-server-name 3 weeks ago

Conversation 2 Commits 2 Checks 7 Files changed 4



 **jlowin** commented 3 weeks ago Member

Server names passed to `fastmcp install` are used as subprocess arguments to CLI tools like `claude` and `gemini`. On Windows, these tools often resolve to `.cmd` wrappers that run through `cmd.exe`, where shell metacharacters in arguments can be interpreted. This adds validation at the shared install entry point to restrict server names to alphanumeric characters, hyphens, underscores, dots, and spaces.

 1

  `fix: validate server names in install commands` ✖ cc2e3ab

  jlowin added the **bug** label 3 weeks ago

  jlowin mentioned this pull request 3 weeks ago

Harden install commands against special characters #2371

🔒 Closed

  marvin-context-protocol bot added **security** **cli** labels 3 weeks ago



chatgpt-codex-connector (bot) reviewed [3 weeks ago](#)

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chatgpt-codex-connector (bot) left a comment

Codex Review

Here are some automated review suggestions for this pull request.

Reviewed commit: `cc2e3ab11f`

▶ [About Codex in GitHub](#)

src/fastmcp/cli/install/shared.py Outdated

```

123     144         )
124     145         name = file.stem
125     146
+    147     + validate_server_name(name)

```

chatgpt-codex-connector (bot) [3 weeks ago](#)

P2 Scope server-name validation to shell-backed install paths

Calling `validate_server_name` unconditionally in `process_common_args` makes every install backend reject names containing characters like `(` or `&`, but some backends (notably Cursor/Goose deeplinks) already URL-encode names with `quote(..., safe='')` and do not pass them through a shell. This introduces a regression where previously supported names such as `"my server (test)"` or `"test&evil=true"` now exit early for `cursor / goose / mcp-json` flows even though those paths can safely carry them, so validation should be limited to shell-backed commands (e.g. `claude/gemini`) or made backend-specific.

Useful? React with / .

[Scope validation to shell-backed install paths only](#)

[a40e6ad](#)

jlowin merged commit `b2d4cc9` into `main` [3 weeks ago](#)

7 checks passed

[View details](#)



jlowin deleted the `fix/sanitize-install-server-name` branch 3 weeks ago



jlowin added a commit that referenced this pull request last week



Publish docs for v3.2.0 (#3713) ...

✓ 3a9717e

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Reviewers



chatgpt-codex-connector[bot]



Assignees

No one assigned

Labels

bug

cli

security

Projects

None yet

Milestone

No milestone

Development

Successfully merging this pull request may close these issues.

None yet

1 participant

