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# GIF poster fetch bypasses traversal scrubbing and exposes local files through public media URLs

**High** DanielnetoDotCom published GHSA-f4f9-627c-jh33 2 weeks ago

## Package

**WWBN/AVideo**

## Affected versions

&lt;=26.0

## Patched versions

None

## Description

### Summary

`objects/aVideoEncoderReceiveImage.json.php` allowed an authenticated uploader to fetch attacker-controlled same-origin `/videos/...` URLs, bypass traversal scrubbing, and expose server-local files through the GIF poster storage path.

The vulnerable GIF branch could be abused to read local files such as `/etc/passwd` or application source files and republish those bytes through a normal public GIF media URL.

### Details

The vulnerable chain was:

- `objects/aVideoEncoderReceiveImage.json.php` accepted attacker-controlled `downloadURL_gifimage`
- traversal scrubbing used `str_replace('../', '', ...)`, which was bypassable with overlapping input such as `....//`
- same-origin `/videos/...` URLs were accepted
- `url_get_contents()` and `try_get_contents_from_local()` resolved the request into a local filesystem read

- 5. the fetched bytes were written into the GIF destination
- 6. invalid GIF cleanup used the wrong variable, so the non-image payload remained on disk

This made the GIF poster path a local file disclosure primitive with public retrieval.

## Proof of concept

- 1. Log in as an uploader and create an owned video row through the normal encoder flow.
- 2. Send:

```
POST /objects/aVideoEncoderReceiveImage.json.php
downloadURL_gifimage=https://localhost/videos/../../../../../../../../../../../../etc/pa
```

- 3. Query:

```
GET /objects/videos.json.php?showAll=1
```

- 4. Recover the generated GIF URL from `videosURL.gif.url`.
- 5. Download that GIF URL.
- 6. Observe that the body matches the target local file, such as `/etc/passwd`, byte-for-byte.

## Impact

An authenticated uploader can read server-local files and republish them through a public GIF media URL by supplying a crafted same-origin `/videos/...` path to `downloadURL_gifimage`. Because traversal scrubbing was bypassable and the fetched bytes were written to the GIF destination without effective invalid-image cleanup, successful exploitation allows disclosure of files such as `/etc/passwd`, readable application source code, or deployment-specific configuration accessible to the application.

## Recommended fix

- Reject any remote image URL whose decoded path contains traversal markers
- Do not allow attacker-controlled same-origin `/videos/...` fetches to resolve into local file reads
- Constrain any local shortcut path handling with `realpath()` and strict base-directory allowlists
- Validate GIF content before saving it into public media storage
- Ensure invalid-image cleanup checks the correct destination path

### Severity

High 7.6 / 10

### CVSS v3 base metrics

Attack vector	Network
Attack complexity	Low
Privileges required	Low
User interaction	None
Scope	Unchanged
Confidentiality	High
Integrity	Low
Availability	Low

[Learn more about base metrics](#)

CVSS:3.1/AV:N/AC:L/PR:L/UI:N/S:U/C:H/I:L/A:L

### CVE ID

CVE-2026-39369

### Weaknesses

▶ CWE-22

### Credits



threalwinky

Reporter