

 [coder](#) / [code-marketplace](#) Public[Code](#) [Issues](#) 16 [Pull requests](#) 3 [Discussions](#) [Actions](#) [Projects](#)

Zip Slip Path Traversal

High [jdomeracki-coder](#) published [GHSA-8x9r-hvwg-c55h](#) 4 days ago

Package

[code-marketplace](#) [\(Go\)](#)

Affected versions

<= 2.4.1

Patched versions

2.4.2

Description

Zip Slip Path Traversal in coder/code-marketplace

Summary

A Zip Slip (CWE-22) vulnerability in `coder/code-marketplace` \leq v2.4.1 allowed a malicious VSIX file to write arbitrary files outside the extension directory. `ExtractZip` passed raw zip entry names to a callback that wrote files via `filepath.Join` with no boundary check; `filepath.Join` resolved `..` components but did not prevent the result from escaping the base path.

Root Cause

`ExtractZip` passed the raw, attacker-controlled `zf.Name` to a caller-supplied callback:

```
return false, fn(zf.Name, zr) // zf.Name not sanitized
```

`AddExtension` constructed the output path with `filepath.Join` and no boundary check:

```
path := filepath.Join(dir, name)           // zip loop
path := filepath.Join(dir, file.RelativePath) // extra files loop
```



`filepath.Clean` resolved `..` lexically but did not confine the result to `dir` :

```
filepath.Join("/srv/ext/pub/1.0", "../../../../../../../etc/cron.d/evil")
→ "/etc/cron.d/evil"
```



Attack Scenario

An authenticated user (any upload-capable role) would submit a VSIX containing path-traversal entries.

On extraction, files would land at attacker-chosen paths writable by the marketplace process, enabling persistence (cron/init injection), SSH key injection,

`ld.so.preload` hijacking, or binary overwrite depending on process privileges.

Fix

Addressed in <https://github.com/coder/code-marketplace/releases/tag/v2.4.2>

Recognition

We'd like to thank [Kandlaguduru Vamsi](#) for responsibly disclosing this issue in accordance with <https://coder.com/security/policy>

Severity

High

CVE ID

CVE-2026-35454

Weaknesses

► CWE-22

Credits

 vamsik2k5

Finder