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# Security Vulnerability: Command Injection in multiple magento2-dev-mcp tools due to unsafe use of child\_process.execAsync #4

Closed#5

Assignees



123mutouren321414 opened last month



## Summary

The MCP server **magento2-dev-mcp** is vulnerable to command injection due to unsafe use of `child_process.execAsync` with user-controlled input in multiple tools.

## Affected Versions

`<= 1.0.2`

## Vulnerable Code

<https://github.com/elgentos/magento2-dev-mcp/blob/master/src/index.ts#L386-L387>

<https://github.com/elgentos/magento2-dev-mcp/blob/master/src/index.ts#L377-L383>

<https://github.com/elgentos/magento2-dev-mcp/blob/master/src/index.ts#L388>

## Details

The MCP server magento2-dev-mcp constructs command strings using user-supplied parameters and executes them via `child_process.execAsync` in multiple tools. Because `execAsync` invokes commands through a system shell, specially crafted input containing shell metacharacters (such as `;`, `&`, or `|`) may be interpreted as additional commands rather than treated as data.

For example, an attacker could supply a malicious value in `key` to inject arbitrary shell commands, which would then be executed with the privileges of the MCP server process.

The vulnerability results from shell-based command execution combined with direct interpolation of untrusted input. In MCP environments, LLM-generated tool parameters influenced by external content may trigger execution of injected commands without direct local user interaction.

## Impact

Successful exploitation allows attackers to execute arbitrary commands on the server hosting the MCP service. This may allow attackers to execute commands, access sensitive data, or modify the host environment depending on the privileges of the MCP server.

## Recommendation

1. Don't use `exec`. Use `execFile` instead, which pins the command and provides the arguments as array elements.
2. Apply strict input validation to all tool parameters exposed to MCP clients, especially `key`, `type`, `path`, `value`, `query`, `event`, `vendorNamespace`, `moduleName`, `authorName`, `authorEmail`, `description`, `languages`, `themes`, `storeId`, `job`, and `group` parameters.
3. Use parameter separation with proper escaping to prevent shell command injection.

## PoC

See the attached files:

[magento2-dev-mcp\\_bug.pdf](#)

👁 1



123mutouren321414 last month

Author




Hi [@peterjaap](#),

I recently reported a potential command injection vulnerability in this project and also submitted a PR with a minimal fix.


Could you please take a look when you have time?


Thanks a lot!



 **peterjaap** assigned [Copilot](#) and [peterjaap](#) [last month](#)



  **Copilot** mentioned this [last month](#)


 [\[WIP\] Fix security vulnerability: Command injection in magento2-dev-mcp #5](#)

 peterjaap [last month](#)

Contributor ...

I'll let AI fix your AI generated report

  **peterjaap** closed this as [completed](#) in [#5](#) [last month](#)

 123mutouren321414 [3 weeks ago](#)

Author ...

[magento2-dev-mcp\\_security\\_advisory.pdf](#)

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### Metadata

#### Assignees

 **Copilot**

 **peterjaap**

#### Labels

No labels

#### Type

No type

#### Projects

No projects

#### Milestone


No milestone

#### Relationships

None yet

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### Development

 Code with agent mode

 **[WIP] Fix security vulnerability: Command injection in magento2-dev-mcp**

elgentos/magento2-dev-mcp

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### Participants

