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# OCSP designated-responder authorization bypass — missing signature verification (RFC 6960 §4.2.2.2)

High u3s published [GHSA-gxrm-pf64-99xm](#) 2 weeks ago

## Package

### OTP

#### Affected versions

&gt;= 27.0

#### Patched versions

27.3.4.10, 28.4.2

### public\_key (OTP)

&gt;= 1.16

1.17.1.2, 1.20.3

### ssl (OTP)

&gt;= 11.2

11.2.12.7, 11.5.4

## Description

### Impact

#### For Erlang/OTP's internal usage (TLS client with OCSP stapling)

- Clients running TLS (SSL) may accept connections to servers with revoked certificates
- Clients may transmit sensitive data to compromised servers
- Requires attacker to control or MITM the server being validated
- Note: Erlang/OTP TLS (SSL) server does not support OCSP stapling
- Note: For legacy reasons the client was actually implemented and documented to do a best effort validation, which by default makes it unreliable. This is now addressed and a must staple behavior is enforced unless user implements its own fallback validation if the staple is missing.

## For applications using `public_key:pkix_ocsp_validate/5` API

- Impact depends on usage context
- Server-side client certificate validation: authentication bypass
- Other scenarios: variable impact

## Workarounds

### For TLS (SSL) users

1. Do not enable OCSP validation setting (current default is `{stapling, no_staple}` )
2. Use CRL-based revocation checking by setting the `{crl_check, true}` SSL option instead

### For applications using `public_key:pkix_ocsp_validate/5` directly

1. Pass `{is_trusted_responder_fun, Fun}` option with a function that validates trusted responder certificates
2. Restrict OCSP responder access to trusted endpoints via network controls (only applicable if you control the OCSP infrastructure)

## Affected/Unaffected Versions

A version larger than or equal to one of the listed *patched versions* is **unaffected**; *otherwise*, a version that satisfies an expression listed under *affected versions* is **affected**, and if it does not, it is **unaffected**.

The documentation of the new [OTP version scheme](#) describes how versions should be compared. Note that versions used prior to OTP 17.0, when the new *OTP version scheme* was introduced, are never listed since it is not well defined how to compare those versions.

In the case of this vulnerability, versions prior to OTP 27.0 are unaffected.

## Credits

Thanks to Igor Morgenstern at Aisle Research for finding and responsibly disclosing this vulnerability to the Erlang/OTP project.

### Severity

High 7.6 / 10

#### CVSS v4 base metrics

#### Exploitability Metrics

Attack Vector

Network

Attack Complexity	Low
Attack Requirements	Present
Privileges Required	None
User interaction	Passive
<b>Vulnerable System Impact Metrics</b>	
Confidentiality	High
Integrity	High
Availability	None
<b>Subsequent System Impact Metrics</b>	
Confidentiality	Low
Integrity	Low
Availability	None
<a href="#">Learn more about base metrics</a>	

CVSS:4.0/AV:N/AC:L/AT:P/PR:N/UI:P/VC:H/VI:H/VA:N/SC:L/SI:L/SA:N

**CVE ID**

CVE-2026-32144

**Weaknesses**

▶ CWE-295

**Credits**

 imorgenstern

Reporter

 IngelaAndin

Remediation reviewer