

pixelsock / **directus-mcp** Public[Code](#) [Issues](#) 6 [Pull requests](#) 7 [Actions](#) [Projects](#) [Security and quality](#)

# fix: patch SSRF vulnerability and upgrade vulnerable dependencies #14

Draft Copilot wants to merge 4 commits into `main` from `copilot/fix-ssrf-vulnerability`[Conversation](#) 1 [Commits](#) 4 [Checks](#) 0 [Files changed](#) 3Copilot AI commented 2 weeks ago • editedContributor

User-supplied `fileUrl` in `uploadFile` was passed directly to `axios.get` with no validation, and any tool could override the Directus API `url` per-request — both sinks reachable by an unprivileged MCP client, enabling SSRF to loopback, RFC-1918, and cloud metadata endpoints.

## SSRF fix ( `index.ts` )

- `validateUrl(rawUrl)` — async guard applied at both sinks:
  - Rejects non-`http:` / `https:` schemes
  - Bare IP addresses validated directly via `net.isIPv4` / `net.isIPv6` (no DNS round-trip)
  - Hostnames DNS-resolved; request rejected if resolution fails entirely
  - All resolved addresses checked against `isForbiddenAddress()`
- `isForbiddenAddress(addr)` — blocks loopback, link-local, RFC-1918, RFC-6598 shared space, unique-local IPv6 ( `fc00::/7` ), link-local IPv6 ( `fe80::/10` ), IPv6 loopback ( `::1` / `::` ), IPv6-mapped IPv4 private ranges ( `::ffff:10.x` etc.), multicast, and reserved ranges; unknown format defaults to forbidden
- `extractMappedIPv4(addr)` — detects `::ffff:x.x.x.x` bypass attempts in compact and expanded form
- `maxRedirects: 0` on the file-download fetch to block redirect-chain bypass

```
// Before – unvalidated user input reaches network sink
const fileResponse = await axios.get(fileUrl, { responseType: 'arraybuffer' });

// After
```

```
await validateUrl(fileUrl);
const fileResponse = await axios.get(fileUrl, { responseType: 'arraybuffer', maxRedirects: 0
```

## Dependency upgrades (package.json)

Package	Before	After	CVEs
@modelcontextprotocol/inspector	^0.10.2	^0.16.6	XSS + missing proxy auth
axios	^1.6.7	^1.13.5	DoS via <code>__proto__</code> , data-size DoS, NO_PROXY SSRF bypass, metadata header injection
form-data	^4.0.0	^4.0.4	Predictable multipart boundary ( <code>Math.random</code> )
path-to-regexp (transitive)	8.2.0	^8.4.0 via overrides	ReDoS via optional groups / multiple wildcards

 [Initial plan](#)

[7476924](#)

 **Copilot** (AI) assigned **Copilot** and **pixelsock** [2 weeks ago](#)


 **Copilot** [started work](#) on behalf of **pixelsock** [2 weeks ago](#)

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 **Copilot** (AI) linked an issue [2 weeks ago](#) that may be closed by this pull request

**[Server-Side Request Forgery Vulnerability in directus-mcp #13](#)**

[Open](#)

 **Copilot** (AI) and others added 3 commits [2 weeks ago](#)

 [fix: prevent SSRF in uploadFile fileUrl and per-request url override](#) ...



[ef87ff0](#)


 [chore: dependency vulnerability upgrade plan](#) ...



[59a2adf](#)

 [fix: upgrade vulnerable dependencies \(inspector, axios, form-data, pa...](#) ...

[c081bb2](#)

  **Copilot** AI changed the title **[WIP] Fix Server-Side Request Forgery vulnerability in directus-mcp**  
fix: patch SSRF vulnerability and upgrade vulnerable dependencies [2 weeks ago](#)

 **Copilot** [finished work](#) on behalf of **pixelsock** [2 weeks ago](#)

  **Copilot** AI requested a review from **pixelsock** [2 weeks ago](#)

**pixelsock** commented [2 weeks ago](#)

Owner

@copilot resolve the merge conflicts in this pull request

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Labels

None yet

Projects

None yet

Milestone

No milestone

Development

Successfully merging this pull request may close these issues.

 **Server-Side Request Forgery Vulnerability in directus-mcp**

**2 participants**

