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# Command Injection Vulnerability in mcp-summarization-functions #26

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## Command Injection Vulnerability in mcp-summarization-functions

### 1) CNA / Submission Type

- Submission type: Report a vulnerability (CVE ID request)
- Reporter role: Independent security researcher
- Report date: March 17, 2026

### 2) Reporter Contact (fill before submit)

- Reporter name: BruceJin
- Reporter email: brucejin@zju.edu.cn
- Permission to share contact with vendor: Yes

### 3) Vendor / Product Identification

- Vendor: Braffolk
- Product: mcp-summarization-functions
- Repository: <https://github.com/Braffolk/mcp-summarization-functions>
- Affected component(s):
- `src/server/mcp-server.ts`

## 4) Vulnerability Type

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- CWE: CWE-78 (OS Command Injection)
- Short title: OS command injection in MCP/HTTP request handling

## 5) Affected Versions

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- Confirmed affected: 0.1.5
- Suspected affected range: revisions containing the same request-to-sink flows listed below
- Fixed version: Not available at time of report (March 17, 2026)

## 6) Vulnerability Description

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A command injection vulnerability (CWE-78) has been identified in mcp-summarization-functions, specifically within the mcp-server.ts component. An attacker with network access to the MCP/HTTP interface can supply maliciously crafted input through the command argument of the summarize\_command tool, which flows unsanitized into OS command execution via execa. This allows arbitrary system commands to be executed with the privileges of the server process, leading to full host compromise, including data exposure, integrity loss, and potential service disruption. Versions up to and including 0.1.5 are confirmed affected.

## 7) Technical Root Cause

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1. `js/command-injection-from-request`
  - Source: `src/server/mcp-server.ts:256 (request)`
  - Sink: `src/server/mcp-server.ts:322`
  - Sink code: `const { stdout, stderr } = await execa(args.command, {`

## 8) Attack Prerequisites

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- Attacker can invoke the MCP/HTTP endpoint or tool handler that reaches the vulnerable sink.
- No effective runtime policy strips or constrains attacker-controlled values before sink usage.
- If SSRF applies: server has network egress to attacker-chosen or internal targets.

## 9) Proof of Concept / Reproduction Guidance

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This proof of concept provides a concise, CVE-style reproduction example for the reported issue.

1. Reproduction request

```
{"jsonrpc": "2.0", "id": 1, "method": "tools/call", "params": {"name": "summarize_command", "arg
```



## 10) Security Impact

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- Confidentiality: High (host/system data exposure possible).
- Integrity: High (command execution may alter server state).
- Availability: High (service disruption via command abuse possible).
- Scope: Changed.

## 11) CVSS v3.1 Suggestion

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- Suggested vector: deployment-dependent (requires maintainer confirmation of effective trust boundary).
- Suggested base score: pending maintainer validation.

## 12) Workarounds / Mitigations

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- Remove direct shell-string execution from request-driven paths.
- Replace free-form commands with fixed allowlists and validated argument schemas.
- Prefer argument-array process execution without shell interpretation.
- Add authentication, authorization, logging, and rate limiting on sensitive MCP/HTTP handlers.

## 13) Recommended Fix

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- Eliminate the request-to-sink data flow documented above.
- Add input schema validation at MCP/HTTP boundaries.
- Add regression tests proving attacker-controlled values cannot reach sensitive sinks.
- Publish a maintainer security advisory once a patch is released.

## 14) References

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- Repository: <https://github.com/Braffolk/mcp-summarization-functions>
- Reviewed source file: `src/server/mcp-server.ts`
- CWE-78: <https://cwe.mitre.org/data/definitions/78.html>

## 15) Credits

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- Discoverer: `BruceJin`
- Discovery method: Static analysis (CodeQL) plus repository source-code audit

## 16) Additional Notes for Form Mapping

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- Audit verdict: Needs manual verification: automated sink classification is inconclusive.

- Dynamic exploit replay status: not completed in this batch run.
- Maintainer should validate release mapping before coordinated disclosure.

**BruceJqs** 2 weeks ago

Author ⋮

**Tools** 🔍

List Tools

Clear

- summarize\_command** >

Execute a command and summarize its output if it exceeds the threshold
- summarize\_files** >

Summarize the contents of one or more files
- summarize\_directory** >

Summarize the structure of a directory
- summarize\_text** >

Summarize any text content (e.g., MCP tool output)
- get\_full\_content** >

Retrieve the full content for a given summary ID

**summarize\_command**

Execute a command and summarize its output if it exceeds the threshold

× Read-only
✓ Destructive
× Idempotent
✓ Open-world

**command \***

```
echo vulnerable; id;
```

**cwd \***

```
.
```

**hint**

Focus area for summarization (e.g., "security\_analysis", "api\_surface", "error\_handling", "d

**output\_format**

text

**Tool-specific Metadata:** Add Pair

No metadata pairs.

🚀 Run Tool

📄 Copy Input

**Tool Result: Success**

**Meta:**

```
{}
```

📄

```
"vulnerable
uid=501(bruce) gid=20(staff) groups=20(staff),101(access_bpf),12
(everyone),61(localaccounts),79(_appserverusr),80(admin),81(_apps
erveradm),98(_lpadmin),701(com.apple.sharepoint.group.1),33(_apps
tore),100(_lpoperator),204(_developer),250(_analyticsusers),395(c
om.apple.access_ftp),398(com.apple.access_screensharing),399(com.
apple.access_ssh),400(com.apple.access_remote_ae)"
```

📄

After executing command via the command injection vulnerability, the "id" result has been successfully displayed.

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### Metadata

### Assignees

No one assigned

**Labels**

No labels

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**Projects**

No projects

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**Milestone**

No milestone



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**Relationships**

None yet

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**Development**

 Code with agent mode 

No branches or pull requests

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**Participants**

