



# EEF-CVE- 2026-32144

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Source	<a href="https://cna.erlef.org/osv/EEF-CVE-2026-32144.html">https://cna.erlef.org/osv/EEF-CVE-2026-32144.html</a> <a href="#">↗</a>
Import Source	<a href="https://cna.erlef.org/osv/EEF-CVE-2026-32144.json">https://cna.erlef.org/osv/EEF-CVE-2026-32144.json</a> <a href="#">↗</a>
JSON Data	<a href="https://api.osv.dev/v1/vulns/EEF-CVE-2026-32144">https://api.osv.dev/v1/vulns/EEF-CVE-2026-32144</a> <a href="#">↗</a>
Aliases	CVE-2026-32144 GHSA-gxrm-pf64-99xm
Published	2026-04-07T12:28:00.767Z
Modified	2026-04-07T15:00:15.346311Z
Severity	<b>7.6 (High)</b> CVSS_V4 - CVSS:4.0/AV:N/AC:L/AT:P/PR:N/UI:P/VC:H/VI:H/VA:N/SC:L/SI:L/SA:N <a href="#">CVSS Calculator</a> <a href="#">↗</a>

**Summary** OCSF designated-responder authorization bypass via missing signature verification

## Details

### Summary

Improper Certificate Validation vulnerability in Erlang OTP `publickey` (`pubkeyocsp` module) allows OCSF designated-responder authorization bypass via missing signature verification.

The OCSF response validation in `publickey:pkixocsp_validate/5` does not verify that a CA-designated responder certificate was cryptographically signed by the issuing CA. Instead, it only checks that the responder certificate's issuer name matches the CA's subject name and that the certificate has the `OCSFSigning` extended key usage. An attacker who can intercept or control OCSF responses can create a self-signed certificate with a matching issuer name and the `OCSFSigning` EKU, and use it to forge OCSF responses that mark revoked certificates as valid.

This affects SSL/TLS clients using OCSF stapling, which may accept connections to servers with revoked certificates, potentially transmitting

sensitive data to compromised servers. Applications using the `publickey:pkixocsp_validate/5` API directly are also affected, with impact depending on usage context.

This vulnerability is associated with program files `lib/publickey/src/pubkeyocsp.erl` and program routines `pubkeyocsp:isauthorized_responder/3`.

This issue affects OTP from OTP 27.0 until OTP 28.4.2 and 27.3.4.10 corresponding to `public_key` from 1.16 until 1.20.3 and 1.17.1.2, and `ssl` from 11.2 until 11.5.4 and 11.2.12.7.

## Workaround

For SSL users:

- Do not enable OCSP validation setting (current default is `{stapling, no_staple}`)
- Use CRL-based revocation checking by setting the `{crl_check, true}` SSL option instead

For applications using `publickey:pkixocsp_validate/5` directly:

- Pass `{istrustedresponder_fun, Fun}` option with a function that validates trusted responder certificates
- Restrict OCSP responder access to trusted endpoints via network controls (only applicable if you control the OCSP infrastructure)


## Configuration


SSL/TLS must be configured with OCSP stapling enabled (e.g., `{stapling, staple}`), or the application must call `publickey:pkixocspvalidate/5` directly. *OCSP stapling is disabled by default (`{stapling, nostaple}`).*

### Database specific


```
{
  "cpe_ids": [
    "cpe:2.3:a:erlang:erlang\\/otp:*:*:*:*:*:*:*"
  ],
  "capec_ids": [
    "CAPEC-459"
  ],
  "cwe_ids": [
    "CWE-295"
  ]
}
```


### References

<https://github.com/erlang/otp/security/advisories/GHSA-gxrm-pf64-99xm> 

<https://cna.erlef.org/cves/CVE-2026-32144.html> 

<https://www.erlang.org/doc/system/versions.html#order-of-versions> 

<https://github.com/erlang/otp/commit/ac7ff528be857c5d35eb29c7f24106e3a16d4891> 

<https://github.com/erlang/otp/commit/49033a6d93a5be0ee0dce04e1fb8b4ae7de1e0c0> 

## Credits

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Jakub Witczak - REMEDIATION\_DEVELOPER

Ingela Anderton Andin - REMEDIATION\_REVIEWER

## Affected packages


**Git**  
[github.com/erlang/otp](https://github.com/erlang/otp)

### Affected ranges

Type GIT

Repo <https://github.com/erlang/otp>

Events Introduced

[601a012837ea0a5c8095bf24223132824177124d](#) 

Fixed

[ac7ff528be857c5d35eb29c7f24106e3a16d4891](#) 

Fixed

[49033a6d93a5be0ee0dce04e1fb8b4ae7de1e0c0](#) 

### Affected versions

▶ OTP-27.\*

▶ OTP-28.\*

▶ OTP-29.\*

▶ Other

## Database specific

▶ source

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