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## Submit #780561: nothings stb (stb\_vorbis.c) ≤ 1.22 Out-of-bounds Write, Integer Overflow

Title nothings stb (stb\_vorbis.c) ≤ 1.22 Out-of-bounds Write, Integer Overflow

### Description

A heap buffer overflow (out-of-bounds write) vulnerability exists in `start_decoder()` in `stb_vorbis.c` v1.22 and earlier, caused by an integer overflow in the comment list allocation.

The `comment_list_length` field is read from untrusted Vorbis comment header data via `get32_packet()` at line 3660. At line 3664, the allocation size is computed as `sizeof(char) * comment_list_length`. When `comment_list_length` is set to a value such as `0x20000002`, the multiplication `8 * 0x20000002 = 0x100000010` overflows the `(int) sz` parameter of `setup_malloc()`, truncating to 16 bytes. The subsequent loop at lines 3668-3670 then writes `comment_list_length` (536,870,914) pointer-sized entries into a 2-entry (16-byte) buffer, resulting in massive sequential heap corruption.

Each out-of-bounds write stores a heap pointer returned by `setup_malloc(len+1)`, where `len` is also attacker-controlled from the packet. The allocated buffers pointed to by these pointers contain fully attacker-controlled data (comment string bytes from the Vorbis packet). This creates a heap corruption primitive where:

1. **Written values**: heap pointers (partially influenced by attacker-controlled allocation sizes)
2. **Pointed-to data**: fully attacker-controlled comment string bytes
3. **Write pattern**: sequential 8-byte writes at stride 0, corrupting adjacent heap chunks

### Exploitation potential:

- **Cache poisoning**: OOB writes corrupt adjacent free chunk `fd` pointers, enabling arbitrary address return from subsequent `malloc()` calls
- **Chunk overlap**: corrupting adjacent chunk size fields causes `free()` to misplace chunks, overlapping with live data
- **Data pointer corruption**: overwriting internal decoder buffer pointers (codebooks, floor configs) redirects later writes to attacker-influenced locations

This vulnerability is triggered via `stb_vorbis_decode_memory()` or `stb_vorbis_open_memory()` when decoding untrusted Ogg Vorbis audio. As a heap-based out-of-bounds write with attacker-controlled data in the overwriting buffers, it may lead to arbitrary code execution, denial of service, or heap corruption.

### ASAN output:

```

...
ERROR: AddressSanitizer: heap-buffer-overflow on address 0x602000000040
WRITE of size 8 at 0x602000000040
...

```

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## Documentation

- [Submission Policy](#)
- [Data Processing](#)
- [CVE Handling](#)

```
#0 start_decoder          stb_vorbis.c:3670
#1 stb_vorbis_open_memory stb_vorbis.c:5112
#2 stb_vorbis_decode_memory stb_vorbis.c:5390
0x6020000000040 is located 0 bytes to the right of 16-byte region
allocated by: setup_malloc -- stb_vorbis.c:960
...
```

Source  <https://gist.github.com/d0razi/2ff8a0e812f74dd6fe7f2943931bb90c>

User  d0razi (UID 96474)

Submission 03/16/2026 01:17 AM (17 days ago)

Moderation 04/01/2026 02:40 PM (17 days later)

Status Accepted

VulDB entry Vuln [Nothings stb up to 1.22 stb\_vorbis.c start\_decoder out-of-bounds write]

Points 20

