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# Submit #793438: Daniel Miessler Personal AI Infra (PAI) 2.3.0 Command Injection

**Title** Daniel Miessler Personal AI Infra (PAI) 2.3.0 Command Injection

## Description

Security Advisory: Command Injection in Daniel Miessler's Personal AI Infrastructure (PAI)

Date: March 12, 2026

Researcher: David Gilmore

Project: danielmiessler/Personal\_AI\_Infrastructure (PAI)

Affected Version: v2.3.0 and prior

Vulnerability Type: Improper Neutralization of Special Elements used in an OS Command (OS Command Injection) (CWE-78)

Severity: Critical (CVSS v3.1: 9.8)

### 1. EXECUTIVE SUMMARY

A critical security vulnerability was identified in the Parser skill of the Personal AI Infrastructure (PAI). The vulnerability allows for remote command injection when the system processes a maliciously crafted URL. Because PAI is designed to scrape and analyze web content as a core function, an attacker can trigger this vulnerability by simply providing a URL containing shell metacharacters, leading to full compromise of the host system.

#### 2.1 Technical Description

The vulnerability is located in the tool-calling logic of the Parser skill. The application uses a shell-based approach to execute curl for web scraping. Specifically, the user-provided URL is directly interpolated into a template string that is then executed via a shell command without sufficient sanitization.

Affected Component: Skills/Parser/Tools/parse\_url.ts (or equivalent shell script in earlier versions)

Root Cause: Use of shell-interpolated strings for executing external CLI tools like curl or yt-dlp.

#### 2.2 Vulnerable Pattern

// Vulnerable Logic

```
const { stdout } = await exec(`curl -L "${userProvidedUrl}"`);
```

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An attacker can provide a URL such as `https://example.com"; rm -rf / #` to terminate the `curl` command and execute arbitrary subsequent commands.

### 3. PROOF OF CONCEPT (PoC)

#### 3.1 Reproduction Steps

Start the PAI environment.

Provide the following command to the assistant:

```
Analyze the content of this URL: https://google.com"; touch /tmp/pai_vulnerable #
```

The AI agent invokes the Parser skill.

The underlying shell executes: `curl -L "https://google.com"; touch /tmp/pai_vulnerable #"`

Result: The file `/tmp/pai_vulnerable` is created on the host system, confirming arbitrary code execution.

### 4. IMPACT ASSESSMENT

Successful exploitation allows a remote attacker (or a malicious document containing a URL) to:

**Host Compromise:** Gain full shell access to the machine running PAI.

**Data Exfiltration:** Access the `PAI_DIRECTORY`, which contains personal context, life goals (Telos), and sensitive history.

**Lateral Movement:** Use the PAI host as a jumping-off point to attack other devices on the local network.

### 5. REMEDIATION RECOMMENDATIONS

#### 5.1 Immediate Fix

Replace shell execution with structured execution that does not involve a shell interpreter. Use `execFile` or `spawn` where arguments are passed as an array.

Secure Implementation:

```
import { execFile } from 'child_process';  
// The URL is passed as a separate argument, preventing shell interpretation  
const { stdout } = await execFile('curl', ['-L', validatedUrl]);
```

#### 5.2 Strategic Mitigations

**URL Validation:** Implement a strict regex-based allowlist for URLs and block internal IP ranges (CCMP protection).

Native APIs: Use native HTTP libraries (like fetch or axios) instead of calling out to system binaries like curl.

Sandbox Environment: Run PAI skills within a containerized or sandboxed environment with restricted filesystem access.

This report was generated following successful disclosure to Daniel Miessler.

[https://github.com/danielmiessler/Personal\\_AI\\_Infrastructure/pull/659](https://github.com/danielmiessler/Personal_AI_Infrastructure/pull/659)

**Source**  [https://github.com/danielmiessler/Personal\\_AI\\_Infrastructure/pull/659](https://github.com/danielmiessler/Personal_AI_Infrastructure/pull/659)

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