

[Products](#)[Services](#)[Publications](#)[Resources](#)[What's new](#)

[Follow @Openwall on Twitter for new release announcements and other news](#)

[\[<prev\]](#) [\[next>\]](#) [\[day\]](#) [\[month\]](#) [\[year\]](#) [\[list\]](#)

Message-ID: <CABU6Y0a0q0=aWxSqcWN7AbNAZS1Yx6nuqBUkAfsfbzJKywwBhw@mail.gmail.com>
Date: Wed, 25 Aug 2021 21:20:09 +0100
From: Mark J Cox <mark@...nssl.org>
To: oss-security@...ts.openwall.com
Subject: OpenSSL SM2 Decryption Buffer Overflow (CVE-2021-3711), Read buffer overruns processing ASN.1 strings (CVE-2021-3712)

OpenSSL Security Advisory [24 August 2021]
=====

SM2 Decryption Buffer Overflow (CVE-2021-3711)
=====

Severity: High

In order to decrypt SM2 encrypted data an application is expected to call the API function `EVP_PKEY_decrypt()`. Typically an application will call this function twice. The first time, on entry, the "out" parameter can be NULL and, on exit, the "outlen" parameter is populated with the buffer size required to hold the decrypted plaintext. The application can then allocate a sufficiently sized buffer and call `EVP_PKEY_decrypt()` again, but this time passing a non-NULL value for the "out" parameter.

A bug in the implementation of the SM2 decryption code means that the calculation of the buffer size required to hold the plaintext returned by the first call to `EVP_PKEY_decrypt()` can be smaller than the actual size required by the second call. This can lead to a buffer overflow when `EVP_PKEY_decrypt()` is called by the application a second time with a buffer that is too small.

A malicious attacker who is able present SM2 content for decryption to an application could cause attacker chosen data to overflow the buffer by up to a maximum of 62 bytes altering the contents of other data held after the buffer, possibly changing application behaviour or causing the application to crash. The location of the buffer is application dependent but is typically heap allocated.

OpenSSL versions 1.1.1k and below are affected by this issue. Users of these versions should upgrade to OpenSSL 1.1.1l.

OpenSSL 1.0.2 is not impacted by this issue.

OpenSSL 3.0 alpha/beta releases are also affected but this issue will be addressed before the final release.

This issue was reported to OpenSSL on 12th August 2021 by John Ouyang. The fix was developed by Matt Caswell.

Read buffer overruns processing ASN.1 strings (CVE-2021-3712)
=====

Severity: Moderate

ASN.1 strings are represented internally within OpenSSL as an `ASN1_STRING` structure which contains a buffer holding the string data and a field holding the buffer length. This contrasts with normal C strings which are represented as a buffer for the string data which is terminated with a NUL (0) byte.

Although not a strict requirement, ASN.1 strings that are parsed using OpenSSL's own "d2i" functions (and other similar parsing functions) as well as any string whose value has been set with the `ASN1_STRING_set()` function will additionally NUL terminate the byte array in the `ASN1_STRING` structure.

However, it is possible for applications to directly construct valid `ASN1_STRING` structures which do not NUL terminate the byte array by directly setting the "data" and "length" fields in the `ASN1_STRING` array. This can also happen by

using the `ASN1_STRING_set0()` function.

Numerous OpenSSL functions that print ASN.1 data have been found to assume that the `ASN1_STRING` byte array will be NUL terminated, even though this is not guaranteed for strings that have been directly constructed. Where an application requests an ASN.1 structure to be printed, and where that ASN.1 structure contains `ASN1_STRING`s that have been directly constructed by the application without NUL terminating the "data" field, then a read buffer overrun can occur.

The same thing can also occur during name constraints processing of certificates (for example if a certificate has been directly constructed by the application instead of loading it via the OpenSSL parsing functions, and the certificate contains non NUL terminated `ASN1_STRING` structures). It can also occur in the `X509_get1_email()`, `X509_REQ_get1_email()` and `X509_get1_ocsp()` functions.

If a malicious actor can cause an application to directly construct an `ASN1_STRING` and then process it through one of the affected OpenSSL functions then this issue could be hit. This might result in a crash (causing a Denial of Service attack). It could also result in the disclosure of private memory contents (such as private keys, or sensitive plaintext).

OpenSSL versions 1.1.1k and below are affected by this issue. Users of these versions should upgrade to OpenSSL 1.1.1l.

OpenSSL versions 1.0.2y and below are affected by this issue. However OpenSSL 1.0.2 is out of support and no longer receiving public updates. Premium support customers of OpenSSL 1.0.2 should upgrade to 1.0.2za. Other users should upgrade to 1.1.1l.

An initial instance of this issue in the `X509_aux_print()` function was reported to OpenSSL on 18th July 2021 by Ingo Schwarze. The bugfix was developed by Ingo Schwarze and first publicly released in `OpenBSD-current` on 10th July 2021 and subsequently in OpenSSL on 20th July 2021 (commit `d9d838ddc`). Subsequent analysis by David Benjamin on 17th August 2021 identified more instances of the same bug. Additional analysis was performed by Matt Caswell. Fixes for the additional instances of this issue were developed by Matt Caswell.

Note

====

OpenSSL 1.0.2 is out of support and no longer receiving public updates. Extended support is available for premium support customers:
<https://www.openssl.org/support/contracts.html>

OpenSSL 1.1.0 is out of support and no longer receiving updates of any kind. The impact of these issues on OpenSSL 1.1.0 has not been analysed.

Users of these versions should upgrade to OpenSSL 1.1.1.

References

=====

URL for this Security Advisory:

<https://www.openssl.org/news/secadv/20210824.txt>

Note: the online version of the advisory may be updated with additional details over time.

For details of OpenSSL severity classifications please see:

<https://www.openssl.org/policies/secpolicy.html>

[Powered by blists](#) - more mailing lists

Please check out the [Open Source Software Security Wiki](#), which is counterpart to this [mailing list](#).

Confused about [mailing lists](#) and their use? [Read about mailing lists on Wikipedia](#) and check out these [guidelines on proper formatting of your messages](#).