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Message-ID: <Y21BdMJyg9QUm2Qw@zuma.herrb.net>
 Date: Thu, 10 Nov 2022 18:22:44 +0000
 From: Matthieu Herrb <matthieu@...rb.eu>
 To: oss-security@...ts.openwall.com
 Subject: Re: CVE-2022-45063: xterm <375 code execution via font ops

On Thu, Nov 10, 2022 at 02:42:41PM +1100, David Leadbeater wrote:
 > xterm before patch 375 can enable an RCE under certain conditions.

>
 > Fix:
 >
 > Upgrade to xterm patch #375
 > <https://invisible-island.net/xterm/xterm.log.html>
 >
 > Mitigation:
 >
 > Set this Xresource:
 > XTerm*allowFontOps: false

Hi,

Running xterm 375 on Arch Linux (Font Ops are enabled by default) and OpenBSD (after re-enabling Font Ops) shows it as still vulnerable using the test below..

>
 > Details:
 >
 > The issue is in the OSC 50 sequence, which is for setting and querying the font. If a given font does not exist, it is not set, but a query will return the name that was set. Control characters can't be included, but the response string can be terminated with ^G. This essentially gives us a primitive for echoing text back to the terminal and ending it with ^G.
 >
 > It so happens ^G is in Zsh when in vi line editing mode bound to "list-expand". Which can run commands as part of the expansion leading to command execution without pressing enter!
 >
 > This does mean to exploit this vulnerability the user needs to be using Zsh in vi line editing mode (usually via \$EDITOR having "vi" in it). While somewhat obscure this is not a totally unknown configuration.
 >
 > In that configuration, something like:
 > printf "\e]50;i\$(touch /tmp/hack-like-its-1999)\a\e]50;?\a" > cve-2022-45063
 > cat cve-2022-45063 # or another way to deliver this to the victim
 >
 > Will touch that file. It will leave the line on the user's screen; I'll leave it as an exercise for the reader to use the vi line editing commands to hide the evidence.
 >
 > Debian, Red Hat and others disable font ops by default (see some good foresight at[1] or this very list[2]), but users can re-enable them via a configuration option or menu. Additionally upstream xterm does not disable them by default, so some distributions include a vulnerable default configuration.
 >
 > This has been assigned CVE-2022-45063.
 >
 > David
 >
 >
 > [1]: <https://bugs.debian.org/cgi-bin/bugreport.cgi?bug=510030>

> [2]: <https://www.openwall.com/lists/oss-security/2015/09/20/2> towards the end.

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Matthieu Herrb

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